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Frozen Embryos, Male Consent, and Masculinities
DARA E. PURVIS*
Picture two men facing the possibility of unwanted fatherhood. One man agreed to
go through in vitro fertilization (IVF) with his partner, but years later has changed
his mind. Despite the fact that the embryos created through IVF are his partner’s
last chance to be a genetic parent, a court allows him to block her use of the embryos.
By contrast, another couple’s sexual relationship broke the law. The woman was
a legal adult, and her partner was a child under the age of eighteen. Their encounter
was thus statutory rape. Her crime led to pregnancy, and after she gave birth, she
sued the teenager for child support. Despite his protest that he did not consent to the
sexual activity that led to the child’s birth, the court affirms the child support order.
As a practical matter, this inconsistency in treatment of unwanted fatherhood may
instinctively make sense, applying two different rules for two very different contexts.
A deeper examination of the cases, however, reveals much more going on. This
Article uses the frame of masculinities theories to dive further into the inconsistency
and uncovers two groundbreaking implications that stretch far beyond the specific
circumstances. First, the varying treatment of embryo disposition disputes and the
characterization of male victims of statutory rape have one constant: a dismissal and
rejection of men’s emotions. Second, exploring the inconsistent treatment of men’s
consent to become fathers in sexual reproduction versus stored embryos reveals a
clear rejection by courts of the personhood concept that embryos are human life.
These revelations inform not only how embryo disposition disputes should be
resolved, but also fetal personhood and family law’s treatment of fathers.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture two men facing the possibility of unwanted fatherhood. One man’s
girlfriend was diagnosed with cancer in her early thirties and told that the cancer
treatment would likely render her infertile. On the advice of her physicians, she began
preparing to have eggs removed in order to be turned into embryos through in vitro
fertilization (IVF) and stored so that after her cancer treatment was complete, she
would have a chance at becoming a genetic mother. She asked her boyfriend to
donate sperm to create the embryos, but he said no. After she turned to a previous
boyfriend, however, her boyfriend changed his mind, and a number of embryos were
successfully created and stored. Her cancer treatment was successful and the couple
married, but before they attempted implantation of any of the embryos, they
divorced. He argued that his ex-wife should not be allowed to use the embryos
without his consent and was successful, blocking her access to her last opportunity
to be a genetic parent.1
By contrast, another couple’s sexual relationship broke the law. A woman in her
midthirties had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old boy. Their sexual encounter
led to a pregnancy, and she asked a court to declare that the minor was the legal father
and impose a child support obligation upon him, even though he was not yet a legal
adult. A court agreed to do so, saying that the boy was “not an innocent victim” and
must take responsibility for his actions.2

1. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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Most people would react to these two scenarios very differently than the courts.
Why allow a man who consented to donating sperm, whose ex-wife relied on his
agreement to make the embryos in the first place, to back out years later when it was
too late for her to make more embryos? Why impose a significant financial burden
lasting nearly two decades on a teenager who was the victim of a crime? Why treat
the two questions of fatherhood so differently and in such counterintuitive ways?
As a practical matter, this inconsistency in treatment of unwanted fatherhood may
instinctively make sense, applying two different rules for two very different contexts.
In cases involving disputes over stored embryos, courts have been given very little
statutory direction and have developed three very different approaches for analyzing
an unusual problem. In cases involving sexual reproduction, however, courts have
applied an inflexible rule based in theory on the greater needs of the newborn child,
prioritizing the child’s needs even above those of the victim of statutory rape. At the
surface level, courts have simply crafted different rules responding to very different
public policy dilemmas where legislatures have left a void in regulation.
A deeper examination of the cases, however, reveals much more going on. This
Article uses the frame of masculinities theories to dive further into the inconsistency
and uncovers two novel implications that stretch far beyond the specific
circumstances. First, the varying treatment of embryo disposition disputes and the
characterization of male victims of statutory rape have one constant: a dismissal and
rejection of men’s emotions. Second, exploring the inconsistent treatment of men’s
consent to become fathers in sexual reproduction versus stored embryos reveals a
clear rejection by courts of the personhood concept that embryos are human life.
The Article begins with an explanation of how embryos are created and stored in
the context of IVF, and the three varying approaches that courts currently use to
resolve disputes arising when the intended parents of the stored embryos later
disagree about what to do with them. Part II turns to the question of consent in the
context of sexual reproduction, demonstrating the inflexible rule of genetic
parenthood as applied to fathers, even where the genetic father could not have legally
consented to the sexual act that led to pregnancy. Part III sets the two contexts against
each other and discusses how the seeming inconsistencies reveal two far-reaching
conclusions: how differently courts in both circumstances treat statements about the
emotions of men and women, and why the inconsistent recognition of men’s consent
to become fathers demonstrates that courts have rejected personhood and instead use
the autonomy of pregnant people as a dispositive question in parentage disputes. The
conclusion turns to the practical implications, recommending significant reforms to
the law of embryo disputes to remove the gendered reliance on women’s emotions,
and why IVF and embryos should be a central part of modern abortion jurisprudence
and rhetoric.
I. THE TECHNOLOGY AND CASELAW OF FROZEN EMBRYOS
Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are how a significant number of
Americans become parents—by one recent estimation, about 1.5% of babies born
per year are created with the assistance of ART.3 One common technique is in vitro

3. Catherine Wheatley, Note, Arizona’s Torres v. Terrell and Section 318.03: The Wild
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fertilization (IVF), combining egg and sperm that have been taken from the genetic
parents’ bodies to implant in a uterus at a later date. In order to do this, the person
whose eggs will be used takes hormones to stimulate the ovaries into producing
multiple eggs, which are removed by doctors who then fertilize the eggs in vitro.4
This carries some risks, including Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome,
uncomfortable side effects from the hormones, infection, and other complications
that accompany any minor surgical procedure.5 After developing through a few cell
divisions, the embryo can be implanted into a uterus or frozen and stored for long
periods of time.6
The IVF process typically results in at least a few (and often as many as a dozen)
embryos being frozen in storage. The process of stimulating ovaries and then
removing eggs is an unpleasant and costly one, so both doctors and patients hope to
produce several usable eggs from any given cycle. Thus, even if a person is actively
trying to get pregnant, there would likely be surplus eggs left over after the
procedure. Those eggs could be frozen before they are fertilized, but the higher water
content of eggs means that freezing them risks ice crystals that can render the egg
unusable after it is thawed.7 By comparison, freezing embryos is more likely to
eventually lead to a successful pregnancy and thus more common.8
As a result, there are likely over half a million frozen embryos currently stored
throughout the country.9 What happens to those embryos (who can authorize their
use, how long they are stored, and so on) is theoretically determined through forms
drafted by fertility clinics and given to the people using their services before
procedures begin.10 In concept, these agreements would lay out the considered
judgments of the genetic parents—but as is so often the case in family law, the reality
is quite different. Forms may not anticipate all future events, such as a married couple
divorcing. Some couples may neglect to specify an answer for some contingencies,
either because they accidentally overlooked a section or because they had not yet

West of Pre-Embryo Disposition, 95 IND. L.J. 299, 299−300 (2020); Carinne Jaeger, Yours,
Mine, or Ours: Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes Through Genetics, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1141, 1142 (2017).
4. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REV. 437, 440 (1990).
5. Browne C. Lewis, Let She Who Has the Womb Speak: Regulating the Use of Human
Oocyte Cryopreservation to the Detriment of Older Women, 72 ARK. L. REV. 597, 604 (2019).
6. Robertson, supra note 4, at 440.
7. Melissa B. Herrera, Arizona Gamete Donor Law: A Call for Recognizing Women’s
Asymmetrical Property Interest in Pre-Embryo Disposition Disputes, 30 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 119, 125 (2019).
8. Seema Mohapatra, Using Egg Freezing to Extend the Biological Clock: Fertility
Insurance or False Hope?, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 384−85 (2014).
9. Valerie A. Mock, Getting the Cold Shoulder: Determining the Legal Status of
Abandoned IVF Embryos and the Subsequent Unfair Obligations of IVF Clinics in North
Carolina, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 246 (2017); see also Katheryn D. Katz, Snowflake
Adoptions and Orphan Embryos: The Legal Implications of Embryo Donation, 18 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 187 (2003) (“In May of 2003, the first national count revealed the full
scope of the phenomenon; there are 400,000 frozen human embryos in fertility clinics . . . .”).
10. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic Consent Forms
Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 59 (2011).

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 206

2/25/22 10:23 AM

2022]

FROZEN EMBRYOS

615

decided what to do and want to leave the decision for later. Or couples might specify
one plan and change their mind as time goes by.
There are many reasons why such a decision is difficult to make in the moment
and why the decision made at the time of the procedure may not remain the
preference of the people involved. As Deborah Forman has argued, people seeking
the services of a fertility clinic generally receive a whole batch of consent forms all
at once, pertaining to the various medical procedures involved in IVF, financial
information, permission for the clinic to share insurance and health information, as
well as long-term decisions about what to do with any surplus embryos that might be
created in the future.11 People who have yet to successfully create a single embryo
are asked whether they wish to grant perpetual consent for use, donate extra embryos
to other people who would use them to become parents, donate extra embryos for
use in medical research, thaw and discard the embryos, or keep the extra embryos in
storage indefinitely.12 Couples are asked to choose among those options for each one
of a number of future events, such as if they divorce, one member of the couple dies,
or both of them die. Jody Madeira’s surveys of patients who have used the services
of fertility clinics found that they were surprised by questions about what to do with
embryos in the future and had not put advance thought into how they would answer.13
Any one of these decisions, accompanied by dense medical and financial information
about IVF, would be difficult to make in isolation, and couples are asked to make
them all at once relatively quickly.
When confronted with such choices, studies have found a gendered pattern in
what options couples actually designate. In a review of almost four hundred IVF
cycles, couples assigned control of embryos differently in the case of one person’s
death according to the gender of the deceased person. If the man died, couples were
more likely to allow the surviving woman to control the embryos and attempt to bring
them to term, but if the woman died, they were more likely to discard or donate the
embryos.14 In the case of divorce, however, even couples who would allow use of
embryos after the death of one partner opted to discard the embryos about half of the
time.15 As the researchers reviewing these decisions speculated,
One wonders if couples are choosing based on logistics [of women being
able to become pregnant rather than needing a surrogate or another
partner to become pregnant], or rather on the assumption that it is more

11. Id. at 67.
12. Brandon J. Bankowski, Anne D. Lyerly, Ruth R. Faden, & Edward E. Wallach, The
Social Implications of Embryo Cryopreservation, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 823, 825 (2005).
13. Jody Lyneé Madeira, The ART of Informed Consent: Assessing Patient Perceptions,
Behaviors, and Lived Experience of IVF and Embryo Disposition Informed Consent
Processes, 49 FAM. L.Q. 7, 22−26 (2015).
14. Sigal Klipstein, Richard H. Reindollar, Meredith M. Regan & Michael M. Alper,
Gender Bias in the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 76 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1181, 1182
(2001).
15. Id. at 1183.
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appropriate for potential children to be reared by their mothers than by
their fathers.16
The danger, obviously, is that people regret their decision later, either because
their preferences have changed or they failed to indicate a clear preference in
advance. Empirical studies show that a supermajority of patients who have gone
through IVF change their minds about what they want done with extra embryos as
time passes.17 As Forman summarizes, preferences often change after patients know
how many embryos they were able to create and after they have had some embryos
implanted. Before any embryos are created, when couples are typically still hoping
to achieve even one successful pregnancy, they “do not seriously consider options
other than using all stored embryos.”18 They are perhaps more sympathetic to the
desires of other couples struggling with infertility and are more willing to say they
would donate any extra embryos to another couple.19 If that same couple successfully
brings one of their own embryos through pregnancy, however, they then see the
stored embryos as potential siblings.20 As Forman explains: “[W]hile we might have
assumed that viewing embryos as akin to children would reduce the interest in
discarding the embryos, in fact, patients viewed donating the embryos to others more
as relinquishing a child, a choice they were not willing to make.”21
The implantation stage of IVF also encourages women22 to feel more attachment
to embryos. Immediately before embryos are transferred, the clinic typically shows
the person undergoing the transfer a photo of the embryos. Jody Madeira has
described the impact:
That image seems to capture so much—the emotional energy required to
ride the IVF rollercoaster, which jolts around in extremes of hope and
despair; the hours spent in the fertility clinic for doctor's appointments,
tests, blood draws, and ultrasounds; the expense of required medications
and treatment; the discomfort, even pain, of massive ovaries and drug
injection sites; the retrieval surgery. All that—for these. For the intended
mother, this picture confirms that she has accomplished all she can in
order to ensure that the cycle results in a successful pregnancy, and also
that she is “pregnant until proven otherwise”—a phrase that female
infertility patients use to denote the expectant state in which one awaits
the “beta” pregnancy test.23

16. Id. at 1184.
17. Forman, supra note 10 at 71.
18. Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. A person of any gender can produce eggs and/or have a uterus, and this Article will
use more inclusive language wherever possible. Here, I mean to imply a gendered treatment
of potential parents by fertility clinics and thus use the term “women” deliberately.
23. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Conceivable Changes: Effectuating Infertile Couples’
Emotional Ties to Frozen Embryos Through New Disposition Options, 79 UMKC L. REV. 315,
319 (2010).
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It is easy to imagine why someone who has gone through multiple unsuccessful
IVF attempts might develop a stronger attachment to stored embryos over time, as
the embryos represent their dwindling hopes to become a genetic parent. Or,
someone who had a successful birth may feel overjoyed at parenthood and hope to
give their child a sibling. Or an even more dramatic context might exist—some
people go through IVF because they were diagnosed with cancer and told that
treatment would damage or destroy their future fertility. In such circumstances,
stored embryos might be the only chance they have at becoming a genetic parent.
Even if an initial agreement contemplated giving up access to stored embryos in the
future, the decision involves incredibly high and deeply personal stakes, and often
an agreement is enforced years after it was first made and after circumstances have
greatly changed.
Given the long time horizon, disputes over stored, frozen embryos typically arise
after an opposite-sex couple who each contributed genetic materials to the embryos
break up and disagree about what to do with the embryos. Most of the time, one of
the partners wants to use the embryos, and the other wishes to discard or donate the
embryos. Resolution of such disputes will either deprive one person of a chance
(perhaps their last chance) at genetic parenthood or foist unwilling parenthood upon
the other.24
In most existing cases, the partner wishing to use the embryos is a woman whose
eggs were used to create them. In such circumstances, she has gone through difficult
and painful medical procedures to extract her eggs. By the passage of time alone, her
fertility is likely worse than when the embryos were created, so starting anew has
even lower chances of success. If the fertilization had taken place in her body, she
would hold decision-making power over the pregnancy, and her ex-partner could not
force her to have an abortion.25 Some commentators have described her as holding a
reliance interest in the stored embryos.26
In other circumstances, loss of stored embryos is recognized as a significant loss,
albeit one that the law often imperfectly compensates. Dov Fox has written
extensively about what he calls reproductive negligence, which encompasses both
people deprived of procreation and procreation imposed upon people.27 Fox has
focused on mistakes made by fertility clinics, such as improperly storing frozen
embryos and causing their unintentional destruction. Courts have, in his words,
“struggle[d] mightily to translate defeated life plans” into legal claims,28 but his work
chronicles the significant harm caused by such mistakes, and at least three courts

24. Occasionally, the litigation takes so long that the embryos are destroyed or otherwise
rendered unusable before a final resolution is reached. See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261, 271, amended sub nom. In re Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002) (noting
that by the terms of the original agreement with the fertility clinic, the two embryos that were
the subject of litigation would have been thawed and discarded the previous year).
25. Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 849 (2000).
26. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in
Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2004).
27. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 153 (2017).
28. Dov Fox, Redressing Future Intangible Losses, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 419, 447−48
(2020).
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have allowed some kind of recovery against clinics for the harm of “negligently
deprived procreation.”29
On the other hand, Glenn Cohen has untangled the concept of freedom from
parenthood, which would be violated if one partner were allowed to use embryos
over the wishes of the other partner to discard them. Cohen traces three dimensions
of the right not to be a parent: “a right not to be a gestational parent, a right not to be
a genetic parent, and a right not to be a legal parent.”30 The latter two would be
violated by the use of previously created embryos against the will of one of the expartners.
In such conflicts, two people who once hoped and planned to conceive and raise
a child together are potentially bound by earlier decisions. Their previous choices,
either to specify who would control the embryos in the case of divorce or their failure
to decide in advance, were made before they knew whether initial IVF attempts
would be successful, before they could assess whether those embryos would be one
path to parenthood or the only remaining chance, and before the demise of their
relationship. Susan Frelich Appleton has described such changed choices as regret,
specifically regret as reconsideration.31 Kaiponanea Matsumura has described what
he calls the “different selves rationale,” arguing that “the person who made the
promise is different in a legally significant way from the person against whom it is
asserted such that enforcement would now be improper.”32 It is no wonder that so
many of the “different selves” end up in court trying to enforce current preferences
rather than older, less-informed choices. The next section turns to what guidance
courts facing such disputes have been given through statute or regulation.
A. Existing Regulations
State legislatures have largely failed to provide any guidance for disputes over
stored embryos. Some states have attempted to prevent such lawsuits by requiring
that patients undergoing IVF be given information to, in the words of California’s
statute, “allow the individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding
the disposition of any human embryos remaining following the fertility treatment.”33
California and a handful of other states require that clinics provide their patients with
agreements that specify what will happen to the embryos in the event of future events
such as the death of one of the partners or if a couple divorces.34

29. Fox, supra note 27, at 196.
30. I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be A Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1121−22 (2008).
31. Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 301
(2011).
32. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REV. 71, 76 (2014).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2018); see also Mary Joy Dingler,
Family Law’s Coldest War: The Battle for Frozen Embryos and the Need for a Statutory White
Flag, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 293, 305 (2019).
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
111L, § 4 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West 2018); see also Carissa Pryor, What
to Expect When Contracting for Embryos, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1111−12 (2020).
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The statutes that most directly substantively regulate disputes over embryos are
generally motivated by antiabortion goals and view the embryos as persons. Such
laws, known as personhood statutes, are often passed as a symbolic statement against
or challenge to abortion rights, and have been proposed in state legislatures very
frequently in recent years.35 General personhood statutes are typically more
concerned with embryos and fetuses in utero, and only implicitly potentially apply
to stored embryos. Two notable exceptions, however, are Louisiana and Arizona.
Louisiana state law defines an embryo as “an in vitro fertilized human ovum” and
identifies it as a natural and juridical person.36 A later section specifies that “[a]
viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be
intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the actions
of any other such person.”37
Arizona goes even further to intervene in disputes over embryos, and specifically
directs that in the case of divorced spouses disagreeing about the disposition of stored
embryos, courts should award the embryos to the spouse who wishes to use them.38
If both spouses wish to use the embryos, the statute specifies that genetic relationship
to the embryo can be used as a tiebreaker (if the embryo was created with only one
spouse’s gametes along with an anonymous donor),39 or as a last tiebreaker to resolve
the dispute “in a manner that provides the best chance for the in vitro human embryos
to develop to birth.”40 The statute does allow a former spouse who does not want the
embryos to be used to opt out of being considered a legal parent to any resulting
children,41 as does Texas.42
New Mexico also indicates a preference for use of all embryos, although its statute
is not as direct as Arizona or Louisiana. In regulations on research involving pregnant
people or fetuses, New Mexico law defines clinical research to not include IVF,
“provided that this procedure shall include provisions to ensure that each living
fertilized ovum, zygote or embryo is implanted in a human female recipient.”43
For the most part, however, courts have been left to resolve disputes over embryos
without guidance from the legislature. The next section discusses the three regimes
courts have coalesced around as they craft their own resolutions.
B. Court Resolutions
Courts have developed three rules of thumb for resolving disputes over stored
embryos: contemporaneous mutual consent, the contractual approach, and a
balancing test. The three approaches rest upon quite different theories of equity,

35.
36.
37.
38.
131.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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weighing of the rights involved, and result in a range of possible outcomes for any
given embryo dispute, depending on the state in which the case arises.
1. Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach to embryo disputes is the clearest,
but also the least flexible: embryos can only be used if both intended parents agree
to the usage at the time of implantation. One of the earliest articulations of the rule
appeared in the Massachusetts case A.Z. v. B.Z. Two former spouses had attempted
to have children for a decade, struggling with two ectopic pregnancies that destroyed
both fallopian tubes of the wife.44 They turned to IVF, which eventually led to a
successful pregnancy with twins.45 During their treatment with the fertility clinic, the
husband and wife signed various consents relating to egg retrieval and IVF, which
said that if the spouses separated, the wife would control disposition of the embryos
for her use.46 Perhaps relying on such documents, even before the separation of the
spouses, the wife had one embryo implanted without the consent or knowledge of
her husband.47
After the spouses split up, the wife wished to use four embryos that remained in
storage.48 The husband disagreed and argued that he had not actually agreed to the
disposition specified in the consent forms. He had apparently signed all of the forms
while they were blank, and the wife filled in the disposition choice later.49 Under
these circumstances, the court described itself as “dubious at best” that the consents
actually represented the choice of the parties.50 Even without questions about the
validity of the consent forms, however, the court explained that it would not enforce
such a consent where one partner had later changed their mind.51 The court identified
a public policy “that individuals shall not be compelled to enter into intimate family
relationships, and that the law shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing such
relationships when they are not desired.”52 Accordingly, regardless of what any
agreement specified previously, former spouses could withdraw their consent at any
time and prevent the other from using stored embryos.
Another well-known example arose in Iowa, in the case In re Marriage of Witten.
The couple in question had gone through IVF in unsuccessful attempts to become
pregnant before deciding to divorce. At the time that they split up, seventeen embryos
remained in storage.53 The wife wanted to implant the embryos either in herself or in
a surrogate, although she said that she would give her ex-husband the choice of
whether to be a legal parent to any resulting children.54 The husband, however,

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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wanted to either keep the embryos in storage or donate them for potential use by
another couple.55 As in A.Z., the court found that it “would be against the public
policy of this state to enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly
personal area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her
mind concerning the disposition or use of the embryos.”56
In some cases, it seems that courts are more comfortable with the result of
contemporaneous mutual consent because the individual parties present unusual and
problematic facts. One such case was decided recently in Missouri. Instead of facing
infertility or a medical diagnosis prompting use of IVF, the couple involved was soon
to be physically separated by the husband’s military deployment. Prior to deployment
he had some of his semen frozen,57 which was then used to create embryos in his
absence.58 While the husband was stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina and his
wife remained at their home in Missouri, she successfully carried twin boys to term
using the embryos and was left with two in storage.59
The spouses had signed a consent form that said that in the event of their later
divorce, the wife would have control over any additional embryos.60 At trial,
however, a number of facts muddied the reliability of the consent form. The husband
testified that he could not remember whether the handwritten choice to grant control
of the embryos to the wife was written on the form when he initialed it.61 Moreover,
the wife’s initials at the same part of the page and the handwritten option giving her
control of the embryos were written in two different colors of ink, and that clause
was dated six days after the final signatures were placed on the form and notarized.62
The courts refused, therefore, to credit the consent agreement, and specified that no
use of the embryos could take place without written consent from both ex-spouses.63
Another case, J.B. v. M.B., involved former spouses who flipped the typical
gender pattern. After using IVF to have a daughter, seven embryos remained in
storage.64 After their marriage ended, the wife wanted the embryos discarded, and
the husband wanted to donate them to other couples struggling with infertility.65 He
argued that his religious beliefs led him to view the embryos as potential life that
should not be discarded.66 The court, however, framed the question as his right to
procreate—which the court noted would not be affected by whether the embryos
were donated to other couples or not—against the wife’s right not to procreate.67
Again, the court cited “public policy concerns” to justify allowing people who had

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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previously signed consent agreements to change their mind and prevent use of stored
embryos by their ex-partner.68
The most obvious advantage of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach is
that it is clear. Some proponents argue that it is also the most realistic view, in the
sense that it recognizes that the preferences of the parties may have understandably
changed in the years since the embryos were created.69 But the clarity and deference
given to changed preferences also mean that one intended parent can veto—or more
problematically, threaten to veto—the other intended parent’s chance at genetic
motherhood or fatherhood. As one court explained as a reason to reject the approach,
requiring contemporaneous mutual consent “give[s] each progenitor a powerful
bargaining chip at a time when individuals might very well be tempted to punish their
soon-to-be ex-spouses.”70 The alternative might be to allow intended parents to lock
in their preferences in advance through a contractual framework, the approach
outlined in the next subsection.
2. The Contractual Approach
As the name implies, the contractual approach to embryo disputes enforces the
agreement made between the couple and memorialized in documents drafted by the
fertility clinic that creates and stores the embryos.71 One representative case is In re
Marriage of Dahl & Angle, which arose in Oregon.72 The spouses had one child
through sexual reproduction, then underwent IVF in the hopes of having a second
child.
As they prepared for IVF, the fertility clinic they used presented them with an
agreement that had a provision specifying who had the right to control any stored
embryos. As the court quoted the agreement, the provision read: “If the CLIENTS
are unable or unwilling to execute a joint authorization, the CLIENTS hereby
designate the following CLIENT or other representative to have the sole and
exclusive right to authorize and direct UNIVERSITY to transfer or dispose of the
Embryos, pursuant to the terms of this Agreement[.]”73 The spouses wrote in the
wife’s name next to that paragraph, and both initialed the provision.74

68. Id. at 719−20. The court did note that it “express[ed] no opinion in respect of a case
in which a party who has become infertile seeks use of stored preembryos against the wishes
of his or her partner,” anticipating some of the questions raised in more recent cases.
69. Matsumura, supra note 32, at 108.
70. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing Mark P.
Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House (and the Business): Recent Trends in
Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1225 (2009)); see also
Sarah Holman Loy, Responding to Reber: The Disposition of Pre-Embryos Following Divorce
in Pennsylvania, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 545, 558 (2018).
71. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 79
N.Y.S.3d 17, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); Findley v. Lee, No. FDI-13-780539, 2016 WL
270083, at *2 (Cal. Super. Jan. 11, 2016); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d 465, 467 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
72. 194 P.3d 834 (Or. 2008).
73. Id. at 836.
74. Id.
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After one IVF implantation was unsuccessful, six embryos remained in storage.75
The couple split up and disagreed about what to do with the remaining embryos: the
husband viewed the embryos as human life and hoped to donate them to couples for
implantation and hopefully pregnancies.76 The wife, by contrast, wished to discard
the embryos.77 The Oregon court found that the agreement unambiguously gave the
wife the sole ability to decide what to do with any stored embryos, so awarded control
to her.78
A less straightforward case was decided earlier this year in Arizona and was
introduced at the beginning of the Article. In 2014, a thirty-three-year-old woman
was diagnosed with breast cancer and told that undergoing chemotherapy to treat the
cancer would likely send her into early menopause and render her infertile.79 After
consulting with a fertility specialist, she decided to preserve her ability to have
genetic children by first going through IVF to create and store embryos before her
chemotherapy began.80 She asked her boyfriend if he was willing to use his sperm to
create the embryos, but he said no.81 She then asked a previous boyfriend, who agreed
to donate sperm. After her boyfriend learned of her plans, he reversed his previous
decision and agreed to donate sperm himself.82
Prior to the procedures, the clinic presented the couple with a number of
documents, including an agreement specifying who could make decisions regarding
the embryos. The agreement contained one section that gave three possible actions
if the intended parents split up, died, or were incapacitated: discarding the embryos,
donating the embryos to another couple, or “[u]se by one partner with the
contemporaneous permission of the other for that use.”83 That section also contained
a “Note” specifying that “Embryos cannot be used to produce pregnancy against the
wishes of the partner. For example, in the event of a separation or divorce, embryos
cannot be used to create a pregnancy without the express, written consent of both
parties, even if donor gametes were used to create the embryos.”84 The agreement
then provided a series of subsections asking the intended parents to specify what they
wanted done with the embryos in the event of various future contingencies.
Subsection (H) addressed divorce, reading: “H. Divorce or Dissolution of
Relationship. In the event the patient and her spouse are divorced or the patient and
her partner dissolve their relationship, we agree that the embryos should be disposed
of in the following manner (check one box only).”85 The form then presented two
options: (1) “A court decree and/or settlement agreement will be presented to the

75. Id. at 836.
76. Id. at 837.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 842.
79. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019), as amended (June 6, 2019),
review granted in part (Aug. 27, 2019), opinion vacated in part, 456 P.3d 13 (2020), as
amended (Feb. 21, 2020).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 684–85.
84. Id. at 685 (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
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Clinic directing use to achieve a pregnancy in one of us or donation to another couple
for that purpose,” or (2) the embryos would be destroyed. The couple checked and
initialed the first option.86
Seven embryos were subsequently created and stored by the fertility clinic.87 The
woman then underwent chemotherapy, which was successful in eliminating her
cancer but, as predicted, left her in a menopausal state that a physician later testified
meant her chances of having a genetic child were less than one percent.88 Following
her treatment, the couple married, but divorced two years later without having
attempted to implant any of the stored embryos.89 The woman wanted to implant the
embryos in the hopes of having a genetic child, whereas the husband opposed any
use by his former spouse.90
After the fight over the embryos became a lawsuit, both the trial and appellate
courts read the IVF agreement’s reference to “a court decree” in subsection (H) as
indicating that a court had the power to award control of the stored embryos. Both
lower courts balanced the interests of the parties: the trial court found that the right
not to become a parent against one’s will trumps the right to become a genetic parent,
so directed the fertility clinic to donate the embryos to another couple.91 The
appellate court instead adopted the contractual approach, but found that “if the
agreement leaves the decision to the court, the balancing approach provides the
proper framework.”92 That court then concluded that “[the woman’s] interests in the
embryos—especially given that she gave up the opportunity to use another donor and
she is likely unable to become a parent (biological or otherwise) through other
means—outweighs [the man’s] interest in avoiding procreation.”93
The state supreme court agreed with the appellate court that the agreement should
control but read the agreement differently to provide a substantive response rather
than a direction to a court to decide what to do with embryos. Where the appellate
court read subsection (H) as giving a court the power to decide, the state supreme
court found that it was not a “final dispositional choice,” and instead specified the
form of any future direction to the fertility clinic:
The provision does not modify or negate the requirement for express,
contemporaneous consent by the parties for a unilateral award of the
embryos to produce pregnancy. Nor does it grant the family court
discretion to make either a unilateral award or direct donation. Instead,
assuming the parties could not produce a settlement agreement, as
occurred here, it requires them to procure a court decree directing FTC
in the disposition.94

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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The court thus concluded that the agreement required contemporaneous consent by
both parties for the clinic to take any action transferring the embryos.
These two cases illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of the contractual
approach. On the one hand, in theory, it gives the most power to the people creating
embryos, letting them consider, decide, and memorialize their own preferences.95
John Robertson, one of the first scholars to write about embryo disputes, stressed the
importance of “knowingly and intelligently made” agreements and the reliance that
future litigants likely placed in those agreements.96 Moreover, historical resistance
to enforcing agreements between family members or sexual partners has had the
effect of reinforcing stereotypical gender and family roles, as Kaiponanea
Matsumura has persuasively chronicled.97 The contractual approach ignores societal
expectations, judicial or other bias, and looks to the wishes of the parties as they
expressed them previously.
On the other hand, the contractual approach often fails to provide an answer.
Sometimes the agreement itself, generally drafted and provided by the fertility clinic,
does not have a section addressing what to do in the case of divorce.98 Sometimes,
as in Terrell v. Torres, courts disagree about what the agreement says. Or sometimes
one party argues that the agreement as presented to the court does not reflect their
actual intentions, either because they did not read or understand the document,99
because they were not given time to adequately consider the document,100 or because
their preferences simply changed in response to time and significantly different
circumstances.101 Faced with such situations, many courts have used what has
become known as the balancing approach, the subject of the next subsection.

95. Terrell, 438 P.3d at 687.
96. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50
EMORY L.J. 989, 995 (2001); see also John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of
Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 424 (1990).
97. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 159, 164 (2013).
98. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 583 (Colo. 2018).
99. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 837 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (“Husband
denied having initialed or read the OHSU agreement, and stated that he had signed the last
page of the document without a notary present and without having seen the rest of the
document.”).
100. See, e.g., Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 7, 2017) (describing the couple being presented with consent documents in the lobby of
the fertility center with only fifteen to twenty minutes to review and complete paperwork with
informed consent for medical procedures and future disposition of embryos).
101. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No.
34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992) (“[W]e recognize that life is not static, and that
human emotions run particularly high when a married couple is attempting to overcome
infertility problems. It follows that the parties’ initial ‘informed consent’ to IVF procedures
will often not be truly informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating, emotionally
and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as the IVF process unfolds.”).
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3. The Balancing Approach
A number of courts resist the arguably clearer rules of contemporaneous mutual
consent or the contractual approach in favor of what has come to be known as the
balancing approach, weighing the interests of the litigants against each other.102
The approach was first applied in an early Tennessee case from 1992.103 The
couple fighting over stored embryos had both already remarried after their divorce,
and neither wanted to use the embryos themselves. Instead, the former wife wanted
to donate the embryos to another couple, whereas her former husband wanted to
discard them.104
In part because the case arose so early, the fertility clinic used by the former
spouses had not provided an agreement that gave direction of what to do with the
stored embryos. Nor had Tennessee given any direction in statutes or regulations of
how to resolve such a dispute.105 The court noted that, ideally, the agreement between
the couple would direct a court concerning the disposition of the embryos, and the
court added that if such an agreement could later be modified by the couple, the
modified agreement should be enforced.106 In the absence of such an agreement,
however, the court decided to “weigh the interests of each party to the dispute.”107
On the one hand, the husband in the case described the potential harm of unwanted
parenthood.108 His childhood had been an unhappy one in which divorce and his
mother’s subsequent nervous breakdown meant that he and three of his five siblings
were sent to live in a church-run institution.109 Because of his experiences, he was
“vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both parents,”
whether that was within the dissolved marriage that he had been in or with another
couple who used the donated embryos and subsequently divorced.110
Assessing the wife’s interests, the court noted that, as would often be the case in
embryo disputes,111 her experience of creating the embryos had been more physically
burdensome than the experience of her husband, as she suffered multiple painful
ectopic pregnancies and six attempts at IVF.112 The court acknowledged that to not
allow her to donate the embryos would “impose on her the burden of knowing that

102. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Bilbao v. Goodwin, No.
HHDFA166071615S, 2017 WL 5642280, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2019). See also Mate v. Mate, an unpublished case that
professes to apply the balancing approach to give control of the embryos to the ex-wife, but
ordered the ex-wife to give her ex-husband notice of any attempted implantations and not to
contest any petitions to terminate parental rights filed by her ex-husband if those implantations
were successful. No. FBTFA156048231, 2016 WL 6603254, at *9, *18 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 23, 2016).
103. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
104. Id. at 590.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 597.
107. Id. at 591.
108. Id. at 603.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 604.
111. Id. at 601.
112. Id. at 591–92.
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the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile.”113 It concluded, however,
that the wife’s interest in donating the embryos was “not as significant” as the
husband’s interest in avoiding unwanted parenthood.114 The decision laid the
groundwork for later cases in its explanation of what might have swung the balance
the other way:
The case would be closer if [Wife] were seeking to use the preembryos
herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other
reasonable means. We recognize the trauma that [Wife] has already
experienced and the additional discomfort to which she would be
subjected if she opts to attempt IVF again. Still, she would have a
reasonable opportunity, through IVF, to try once again to achieve
parenthood in all its aspects—genetic, gestational, bearing, and
rearing.115
Twenty years later, a Pennsylvania court addressed precisely the closer case
contemplated in Reber v. Reiss.116 The ex-spouses in the case went through IVF after
the wife was diagnosed with breast cancer at the young age of thirty-six.117 After her
doctors told her that cancer treatment would likely affect her fertility, she delayed
the start of her treatment to allow doctors to collect eggs, which they used to create
thirteen embryos.118 After her treatment was concluded, her husband filed for
divorce.119
The wife in Reber was immensely sympathetic: she had been forced to make a
quick decision to create the embryos. She had risked her own health and life by
delaying cancer treatment to do so, so it was obviously important to her. By the time
that the ex-spouses were fighting over disposition of the stored embryos, the wife’s
doctors had indicated that chemotherapy had affected her fertility such that the stored
embryos were her last chance at being a genetic mother.120 And perhaps adding
emotional insult to injury, her husband had a child with another woman eighteen
months after their separation.121
The lawsuit eventually reached the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which noted “a
compelling circumstance not at issue in cases resolved by our sister states . . . Wife
has no ability to procreate biologically without the use of the disputed preembryos.”122 Yet the agreement signed at the fertility center did not provide an
answer, as neither spouse signed the portion that specified what to do with the stored

113. Id. at 604.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). This author rewrote the decision as part of the
Feminist Judgments Project book series. See Dara E. Purvis, Rewritten Reber v. Reiss, in
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE REWRITTEN 255 (Kimberly Mutcherson ed., 2020).
117. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1132–33.
118. Id. at 1133.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1138.
121. Id. at 1133.
122. Id. at 1137.
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embryos if the couple divorced or if one of them died.123 The contractual approach
was thus unhelpful. The court also dismissed using a rule of contemporaneous mutual
consent since “it was quite obvious” that the spouses would not agree.124 The court
concluded that using a balancing approach was the “most suitable” option.125
The court then discussed each ex-spouse’s interests. As already described, the
wife was in an extreme position, in that the embryos were almost certainly her only
opportunity to become a mother. The court acknowledged the possibility that she
might adopt a child, although it also noted that the wife argued at trial that as an
unmarried forty-four-year-old cancer survivor, she was unlikely to be considered a
desirable option for adoptive placements.126 Moreover, the decision recognized that
the wife wanted to be pregnant and give birth to a child genetically related to her, a
desire that would not be satisfied through other paths to parenthood:
There is no question that the ability to have a biological child and/or be
pregnant is a distinct experience from adoption. Thus, simply because
adoption or foster parenting may be available to Wife, it does not mean
that such options should be given equal weight in a balancing test.
Adoption is a laudable, wonderful, and fulfilling experience for those
wishing to experience parenthood, but there is no question that it
occupies a different place for a woman than the opportunity to be
pregnant and/or have a biological child. As a matter of science,
traditional adoption does not provide a woman with the opportunity to
be pregnant.127
By contrast, the husband had several reasons to explain his interest in not
becoming a parent with his ex-spouse. First, he explained his own upbringing as an
adopted child who did not know his biological father.128 He did not want to bring a
child into the world through a marriage and relationship that had already failed,
guaranteeing a distant relationship between himself and the child. He also argued
that he did not want to assume the financial obligation of another child.129
After weighing the two interests against one another, the court concluded that the
wife’s interests won.130 The court explained that the husband’s interests were
addressed by the fact that his ex-wife promised that she would allow him to be
involved in the child’s life,131 and that she would “do her best” to not seek child
support payments from her ex-husband.132 As a result, the frozen embryos were
awarded to the wife.133

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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As the preceding discussions have illustrated, the consent of a man to become a
father is given varied treatment in the context of disputes over stored embryos. If the
dispute arises in a state in which courts have applied the contemporaneous mutual
consent approach, then the father’s current lack of consent is dispositive. If the court
hearing the case applies the contractual approach, a previous memorialization of
consent or non-consent will be enforced. But if the balancing approach is applied,
the man’s lack of consent will be set against the perceived need of his ex-partner,
which in some circumstances will outweigh his preference entirely. The patchwork
of approaches makes disagreements over the fate of stored embryos unpredictable,
particularly if the balancing approach is used.
By contrast, treatment of men’s and boys’ consent in the case of sexual
reproduction has been evaluated extremely differently, and quite consistently: it is
irrelevant. The next Part turns to how men’s consent is ignored in the context of
sexual reproduction.
II. SEXUAL REPRODUCTION AND MEN’S CONSENT
In contrast to the difficult determinations of control over frozen embryos,
determinations of legal parentage in the context of sexual reproduction are typically
much simpler, using bright-line rules of marriage and biological links. Examination
of some of the more challenging examples of genetic fatherhood, particularly in cases
where the biological father was under the age of consent at the time of conception,
demonstrates a strikingly inflexible commitment to genetic link as generating
parental responsibilities. This link seems to be in stark contrast with the more flexible
logic represented in the case of frozen embryo disputes, but ultimately embodies a
consistent legal implementation of the norms of hegemonic masculinity.
For most children born each year, their parentage is determined simply through
operation of the marital presumption. Under the marital presumption, a child born to
a married woman is the legal child of the married woman and her husband.134 This
presumption operates without concern for any proof of a genetic link between the
husband and the child, and in some notable examples has withstood proof that the
husband is not the biological father.135
If the parents are unmarried, by contrast, identification of the legal father is more
difficult. If the biological father wishes to claim status as a legal parent, he may be
able to sign a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity, at least if he is on amicable
terms with the biological mother. If he is not, and she prevents him from seeing or
knowing about the birth, he may not be able to claim status as a legal parent, and the
Supreme Court has said he has no constitutional right in play before that
determination.136
If the mother or the state wishes to pursue the biological father for child support,
however, the answer is quite clear that the genetic link is enough to justify his

134. Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modern
Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037, 2038 (2016).
135. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
136. See Dara E. Purvis, The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
542 (2019); Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 666 (2014).
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identification as a legal parent and imposition of a child support order. The rule tying
child support to genetics is simple and unyielding. Michael Higdon, for example, has
written extensively about contexts in which men have been found liable for child
support despite never having consented to the sexual act that led to the pregnancy.137
This “regime of genetic entitlement,” as Jennifer Hendricks has called it, leads to all
sorts of public policy concerns regarding consent of either party in a sexual
encounter, such as giving rapists the status of legal parent and ability to request
visitation or custody.138
For purposes of the contrast with embryo disputes, however, this Article focuses
upon circumstances where legal fatherhood is imposed despite a lack of consent. The
next section addresses the most extreme example, statutory rape.
A. Statutory Rape as Fatherhood Without Consent
Statutory rape is premised on the idea that children cannot legally consent to
sexual activity.139 Regardless of the child’s purported verbal consent or consent
expressed through physical action, sexual conduct with the child is criminalized.
Despite this explicit treatment of children as unable to consent, boys who have been
the victims of statutory rape are routinely and uniformly held liable for child support
obligations.140
Some examples of such impositions of a child support obligation occur in the
context of a difficult public policy problem: both biological parents are underage,
leaving the baby in a position of particular economic need and blunting at least some
of the criticism of imposing child support on the victim of a crime.141 The best-known
example of such a case is probably State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, in which the

137. Michael J. Higdon, Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers: A Feminist Look
at the Reproductive Freedom of Unmarried Men, 66 ALA. L. REV. 507, 517 (2015); Michael
J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination and the Duty of Child
Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 411 (2012).
138. Jennifer S. Hendricks, The Wages of Genetic Entitlement: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly in the Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 76 (2017).
139. Dara E. Purvis & Melissa Blanco, Police Sexual Violence: Police Brutality, #MeToo,
and Masculinities, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1487, 1505 (2020).
140. L.M.E. v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902, 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (“The courts that have
considered this issue have uniformly concluded that the fact that a child results from the
criminal sexual act of an adult female with a minor male does not absolve the minor from the
responsibility to pay child support.”); Garrison, supra note 25, at 860; Higdon, Fatherhood by
Conscription, supra note 137, at 425 (“[E]very court to consider the issue of whether a male
victim of statutory rape is liable for child support has reached the same conclusion, using the
same reasoning . . . .”); Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male
Victims of Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?,
36 GA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2002).
141. See, e.g., Hamm v. Off. of Child Support Enf’t, 985 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Ark. 1999)
(“Those cases in no way establish a public policy that an underage consenting male victim
who impregnates the sexual-abuse perpetrator, here a fifteen-year-old female, should be
relieved from any responsibility for the child born of that sexual relationship. While Arkansas
does not appear to have any case law directly on point, other jurisdictions have soundly ruled
contrary to Scott’s contention.”).
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mother was the sixteen-year-old babysitter of the twelve-year-old father.142 That age
difference still triggered statutory rape laws even though the girl was herself
underage, so the court acknowledged the baby’s conception involved “criminal
activity on the part of the other parent.”143 Despite this, the court’s opinion clearly
viewed the boy as something other than a victim. At one point, the court noted that
the boy did not “register any complaint to his parents about the sexual liaison.”144
The court also referred to the baby as “the only truly innocent party.”145
This problematic view of the male victims of statutory rape as voluntarily
assuming the risk of pregnancy holds true even where the woman involved in the
encounter is an adult. One of the most egregious age differences between partners
was at issue in County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathanial J., introduced at the start of
the Article, in which a thirty-four-year-old woman had sex with a fifteen-year-old
boy.146 Despite an almost two-decade difference in their ages, and the criminal law’s
proposition that a boy that age could not legally consent to the sexual encounter, the
court described the woman as “seduc[ing]” the victim, rather than the more accurate
description that she sexually assaulted him.147 The court stated that the boy was “not
an innocent victim of [the woman’s] criminal acts,” because he “willingly
participated” in the sexual activity.148 The court’s attitude was clear from the first
words of its decision: “Victims have rights. Here, the victim also has
responsibilities.”149
Some courts stress the needs of the child for financial support. One court found
that “[t]o penalize this child for the mother’s actions would run contrary to the
fundamental purpose” of child support proceedings.150 Another court contemplated
changing obligations as the father reached adulthood, writing that “[t]he rights of the
child cannot be permanently foreclosed because his father was a minor at the time of
conception.”151 Another case reasons that “the mother’s conduct should have no
bearing on the father’s duty of support,” since the purpose is to protect the child.152
More often, however, courts simply reject the premise of statutory rape laws and
say the boys were not victims. More than one court states it outright: it was “hard to
characterize appellant as the classic innocent victim of a crime,”153 or in another case
saying that a fifteen-year-old “was not an innocent victim of [the adult’s] criminal

142. 847 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Kan. 1993).
143. Id. at 1279.
144. Id. at 1277.
145. Id. at 1279.
146. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), as modified (Nov. 20, 1996).
147. Id. at 843.
148. Id. at 845.
149. Id. at 843.
150. Mercer Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Imogene T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290
(Fam. Ct. 1992).
151. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Bennett v. Miller, 688 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
152. In re Weinberg v. Omar E., 482 N.Y.S.2d 540, 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
153. Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).

363152-ILJ 97-2_Text.indd 223

2/25/22 10:23 AM

632

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:611

act.”154 One describes the victim of a sex crime as “reckless.”155 Many decisions
describe the victim as having consented, even though (to restate the obvious) the
victim is legally incapable of consent: “No factual assertions in the opposing
affidavits submitted by or on behalf of [the underage boy] state or give rise to a
reasonable inference that his sexual intercourse with [the mother] was forced upon
him or occurred without his consent.”156 Another court “gives no credit to [the
underage boy’s] testimony that he was forced to have sex with the mother.”157 Yet
another writes that the underage boy “did not claim that his participation in the events
which allegedly led to the child’s conception was involuntary or forcibly
compelled.”158 Another refers to the boy as “technically a victim.”159
Other courts try to split the boy’s status as the victim of a crime from the fact of
his biological parenthood. One early example from 1961 is particularly dismissive:
In his brief, [the boy] cites [state law] which defines rape in the third
degree by a female of a male person under the age of eighteen years. We
are not entirely sure of the application he would have us make of that
provision to the facts of this case. If, however, he supposes, as we
surmise he does, that by reason of this section his testimony should be
viewed more favorably than that of other witnesses, it having an ethereal,
mystic operation whereby his testimony becomes more worthy of belief,
we have failed to discover any such purpose or effect from the wording
of such statute. Certain it is that his assent to the illicit act does not
exclude commission of the statutory crime, but it has nothing to do with
assent as relating to progeny. His youth is basic to the crime; it is not a
factor in the question of whether he is the father . . . .160
Although the sneering language might be attributed to the time, more recent cases
follow the same logic that “[i]f voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then for
purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. This is true even if a fifteenyear-old boy’s parenthood resulted from a sexual assault upon him within the
meaning of the criminal law.”161 A 2004 opinion found that:
the issue presented by this case is not [the adult’s] criminal culpability
for criminal sexual conduct, or whether respondent was—or could have
been—a ‘consensual’ participant in that activity. Rather, we are

154. In re Paternity of K.B., 104 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
155. In re J.S., 550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
156. In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273, 275–76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
157. Mercer Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Imogine T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288,
289 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
158. Commonwealth ex rel. Rush v. Hatfield, 929 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
159. L.M.E. v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
160. Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333, 334–35 (Colo. 1961) (paragraph break
omitted).
161. In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d at 276–77.
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concerned with whether respondent may be liable for child support for
the child that resulted from the sexual activity.162
B. Factual Questions of Consent
Statutory rape is an unusually clear context in which consent is not legally present,
but other examples of at least questionable consent exist with similarly problematic
results that rely solely on genetic links to impose child support. One example is what
Michael Higdon calls “stolen sperm,” in which a man consented to a sexual act, but
not sexual intercourse.163 As Higdon writes, “whether this ‘theft’ occurred during
nonconsensual intercourse or whether the sperm was harvested from sexual activity
other than intercourse and then surreptitiously used for insemination, the courts have
universally reached the same result. Specifically, the lack of consent is no bar to an
obligation to pay child support.”164
Even allegations of forcible sexual assault have been viewed as insufficient to
disturb the obligation of child support arising from genetic fatherhood. In an
infamous Alabama case from 1996, a man alleged that he had been sexually assaulted
at a party.165 Identified in the case as S.F., he had been drinking at a nightclub before
traveling to a woman’s house, and had drunk enough before he arrived that he had
vomited.166 The man’s brother testified that S.F. had vomited again after arriving, so
the brother and the woman hosting the party had put an unconscious S.F. into bed.167
When the brother was leaving the party at about six o’clock in the morning, he was
not able to wake S.F., so he left him in bed.168 The brother returned later that morning
and testified that S.F. had yet to sober up from the night before.169 S.F. testified that
he didn’t remember anything past when he was put into bed, but woke up the
following morning wearing only an unbuttoned shirt.170 Three people testified that
the woman later told them that she had had sex with S.F. while he was unconscious,
one saying that the woman had said it “saved her a trip to the sperm bank.”171
The woman became pregnant and sued S.F. for child support. He argued that
because he did not consent to any sexual activity with the woman, it violated his due
process rights to be liable for child support.172 The appellate court held, as a matter
of law, his consent was irrelevant:

162. L.M.E., 680 N.W.2d at 911–12.
163. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription, supra note 137, at 426–31; see also Purvis,
Origin, supra note 136, at 665–66.
164. Higdon, Marginalized, supra note 137, at 523 (citing Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992,
2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005)); see also State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d, 1032,
1035–36 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
165. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1188.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1187.
171. Id. at 1188.
172. Id. at 1187.
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The child is an innocent party, and it is the child’s interests and welfare
that we look to . . . . The purpose of this act is to provide for the general
welfare of the child; any wrongful conduct on the part of the mother
should not alter the father’s duty to provide support for the child.173
Although such cases are thankfully rare, an unreported 2002 case from Wisconsin
reached similar conclusions. In that case, the man alleged that he had been sexually
assaulted after having been given a date rape drug.174 Although a jury did not find
that he had definitely been given the drug, it did find that he had proven that he had
not consented to sexual intercourse.175 On appeal, however, that court found that the
man was entitled to a jury trial only on the question of whether he was the child’s
father, and he had admitted that he was the biological father.176 Under the court’s
logic, this rendered any allegations about the circumstances of that biological
fatherhood irrelevant, at least for purposes of imposing a child support obligation.
Such reliance on genetics to satisfy any question of paternity would be
problematic on its own, but in other cases courts have used the circumstances of
conception to deny a biological father parental status. Judge Richard Posner wrote
an opinion for the Seventh Circuit in one such case arising out of statutory rape with
an adult male perpetrator.177 The facts are bizarre and troubling in multiple ways.
The case began when Ruben Peña, then nineteen years old, committed statutory rape
by having sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl.178 Although Peña continued
his relationship with the girl,179 she did not tell him when she went into labor and
delivered their child.180 Subsequently her father had Peña meet him at a restaurant,
where Peña was arrested for a felony statutory rape charge.181 The problem, however,
was that the charge Peña was arrested for required that the perpetrator of the statutory
rape be at least five years older than the victim, and the difference in ages between
Peña and the girl was only four years. Both the father, who signed the charge, and
the state prosecutor who drafted the complaint knew this, and thus knew that the
charge was inaccurate.182 After Peña’s sister learned that he had been arrested, she
called the home of the girl. The girl’s aunt, who was a state judge, answered the
phone and told Peña’s sister not to call again and that Peña’s bail would be increased
the following day.183 The aunt was not the judge in Peña’s case, but she was right
that Peña’s bail was increased—as Posner writes for the court, this “suggests that she
may have spoken to the judge who handled [Peña’s] case.”184

173.
174.
2002).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Id. at 895.
Id.
Id. at 895–96.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2/25/22 10:23 AM

2022]

FROZEN EMBRYOS

635

In the meantime, the girl’s parents had taken her, while she was in labor, from
Illinois to Indiana, where she gave birth.185 The speculated reason for the travel was
that Indiana had a statute that specified that if the mother of a child was under sixteen
years old when the child was conceived, she and the state did not have to secure the
consent of the biological father for the child to be placed for adoption.186 The child
was placed with adoptive parents without Peña’s knowledge or consent.187
Peña later sued, arguing that the prosecutor and the girl’s parents and aunt
deprived him of his constitutional right inhering in his relationship with the child.188
The court rejected his claim, relying on a line of Supreme Court cases holding that
unmarried biological fathers hold a substantive due process right only once they have
created a substantial relationship with their biological child, something that Peña was
unable to do since the baby was adopted while he was in police custody.189 Posner
went further to explain the significance of the fact that Peña had committed statutory
rape:
The criminal does not acquire constitutional rights by his crime other
than the procedural rights that the Constitution confers on criminal
defendants. Pregnancy is an aggravating circumstance of a sexual
offense, not a mitigating circumstance. The criminal should not be
rewarded for having committed the aggravated form of the offense by
receiving parental rights which he may be able to swap for the agreement
of the victim's family not to press criminal charges.190
This logic is sound and is the basis of many criticisms of giving rapists parental
status.191 Yet even Posner acknowledged that the reasoning is not applied for
purposes of child support where the genders of perpetrator and victim are reversed,
writing that although this “could be thought to be ‘rewarding’ the malefactress . . .
the motive is different; it is to help the child.”192 Helping the child, however, is
understood solely as finding a private source of financial support. Peña sued because
he wanted the adoption reversed and wanted the opportunity to claim custody rights.
It may be that he would not have received custody—his commission of statutory rape
would certainly weigh against him in an assessment of the child’s best interests—but
it is curious that a biological parent seeking to claim parental responsibilities would
be dismissed as not attempting to help the child.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 898.
188. Id. at 897.
189. Id. at 899.
190. Id. at 900.
191. See, e.g., Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 275 (2012); Anastasia Doherty, Choosing to Raise a Child Conceived Through Rape:
The Double-Injustice of Uneven State Protection, 39 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 220 (2018);
Hendricks, supra note 138; Shauna R. Prewitt, Giving Birth to a "Rapist's Child": A
Discussion and Analysis of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become
Mothers Through Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827 (2010); Moriah Silver, The Second Rape: Legal
Options for Rape Survivors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM. L.Q. 515 (2014).
192. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900–01.
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The contrast between male consent in the context of sexual reproduction and the
context of frozen-embryo disputes is similarly curious. In the context of sex, the
biological link itself is used to impose parental responsibility—not consent to
pregnancy, not even consent to the sexual act. Genetic link has been deemed enough
as a matter of law. Yet in the context of frozen-embryo disputes, two of the three
approaches look to expressed consent to decline parental responsibility. Obviously,
much of this difference arises from the extreme circumstances of such cases. But the
difference can also be explained through a masculinities frame, asking what society
and the legal system expect of men. The next part turns to this question.
III. INSIGHT FROM MASCULINITIES THEORIES
Exploration of gender stereotypes often focuses, quite understandably, on the
oppression that gender bias works upon women.193 Masculinities theories look to
stereotypes and expectations about men’s behavior and ask what harm such
stereotypes also cause to men.194 This harm does not negate or deny the sexism that
remains a powerful force in American society and law but acknowledges the different
ways that men of different races, classes, sexualities, and other characteristics
experience expectations of manhood.195 The gendered constructions of masculine
and feminine can both privilege manhood and limit what manhood should look
like.196 Anyone who deviates from “ideal” manhood, known as hegemonic
masculinity, is seen as less of a man and faces sanction or punishment.197
Masculinities analysis exposes the harm of gender stereotypes in many
contexts,198 but family law is a particularly rich area of exploration. Masculinities

193. See Michael Kimmel, Integrating Men into the Curriculum, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 181, 186 (1997) (“American men have come to think of themselves as genderless, in
part because they can afford the luxury of ignoring the centrality of gender.”).
194. Purvis & Blanco, supra note 139, at 1512; Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal
Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996). Nancy
Dowd has described the work of masculinities as “ask[ing] the man question.” Nancy E.
Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 204
(2008).
195. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the
Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 269–70 (2013);
see also Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and Feminist
Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 420–21 (2010) [hereinafter Dowd, Asking the Man
Question].
196. See Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 45
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (2012) [hereinafter Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality];
Dowd, Masculinities, supra note 194, at 230.
197. See Purvis & Blanco, supra note 139, at 1511; see also Dara E. Purvis, Trump, Gender
Rebels, and Masculinities, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 429–31 (2019) [hereinafter Purvis,
Trump]; Dara E. Purvis, The Sexual Orientation of Fatherhood, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 983,
991–97 (2013) [hereinafter Purvis, Sexual Orientation].
198. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops,
and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009) (discussing masculinities and the
police); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777 (2000) (discussing violence and masculinities); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work,
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play a key role in family law in that they help to explain often contradictory ways
that men are treated by the law and ways that men act within families. For example,
one of the most fundamental precepts of hegemonic masculinity is defining what
men are not: men are not women.199 Fathers are not mothers.200 Fathers do not engage
in nurturing caregiving; they are breadwinners who give their children financial but
not emotional support.201 Men live individual lives and lack the strong family
relationships that women have.202
Both in reference to their families and in broader contexts, men do not express or
even acknowledge emotions. Men are expected not to acknowledge emotional
suffering or harm and certainly not to speak about it openly.203 Expressing emotion,
especially emotion about family relationships, is seen as feminine and thus
unacceptable.204
Both of these directives of hegemonic masculinity—fatherhood is breadwinning,
and real men do not talk about their emotions—operate strongly in the contexts of
embryo disputes and consent to sexual activity. Delving further into the way
masculinities operate in these contexts explores some of the starkest inconsistencies
in male consent and illuminates the broader implications of frozen-embryo disputes.
The next section discusses how courts hearing embryo disposition disputes
underscore masculinities’ insight about men and emotion.
A. The Power of Gender Stereotypes on Emotional Arguments
In both embryo disputes and questions of consent in the context of sexual
reproduction, the perceived harm of unwanted parenthood articulated by courts is
primarily financial: the harm of a child support obligation. This is fatherhood as
defined by hegemonic masculinity, rejecting the emotional caregiving work of
parenthood in favor of the more stereotypically masculine competition and
breadwinning of the marketplace.205
This rejection of emotion helps to explain why the interests of boys victimized by
statutory rape are so easily dismissed in favor of the perceived financial need of the
child. It even helps to explain why courts are so reluctant to label such boys victims
at all. Hegemonic masculinity sees sex as a competition, as one way to dominate both
the women a man has sex with (hegemonic masculinity is rigidly homophobic)206

83 OR. L. REV. 359 (2004) (discussing masculinities and employment); Valorie K. Vojdik,
Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 68 (2002) (discussing masculinities and male-dominated institutions such
as military-style academies).
199. See Dowd, Asking the Man Question, supra note 195, at 418.
200. Purvis, Trump, supra note 197, at 431–32.
201. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality, supra note 196, at 1049–50.
202. Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards A New Framework
for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 448–49 (2010).
203. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 195, at 282.
204. Levit, supra note 194, at 1062.
205. See Purvis, Trump, supra note 197, at 431–32; Purvis, Sexual Orientation, supra note
197, at 993.
206. See Purvis, Trump, supra note 197, at 439.
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and the other men to whom the hegemonic man brags about those sexual
encounters.207 There is no room in hegemonic masculinity to acknowledge that some
sexual encounters might be unwanted or might cause lasting emotional harm. Susan
Frelich Appleton has referred to the financial burdens imposed on male victims of
statutory rape as “the price of pleasure,” the sexual pleasure assumed to have been
enjoyed by the victim of a crime when hegemonic masculinity refuses to contemplate
that a boy might have mixed or negative feelings about sex.208
Similarly, frozen-embryo disputes demonstrate the impact of hegemonic
masculinity in courts’ failure to equally recognize the emotions of men and women
facing difficult questions about parenthood. In particular, the balancing approach is
deeply rooted in gendered stereotypes around parenthood. When called upon to
assess the desires of litigants to become or not become a parent, or the supposedly
objective value of control over embryos to those desires, courts repeatedly credit the
desires of women to become mothers while dismissing men’s emotions.
Most specifically, courts stress over and over the importance of becoming a
mother. The Reber court noted that a wife’s “compelling interests” included “what
is likely her only chance at genetic parenthood and her most reasonable chance for
parenthood at all.”209 The Szafranski court described the wife’s “last and only
opportunity to have a biological child with her own eggs.”210 The court referenced
the wife’s family history as part of her desire for a biological child, noting that she
wanted to become a mother to maintain some part of her father, who passed away
when she was a young child.211 The Terrell appellate court viewed the fact that the
couple had attempted IVF as proof of the strength of the wife’s desire, noting the
strength of “Torres’ desire to have a biologically-related child—which was the entire
purpose of engaging in IVF in the first place.”212 The Patel court described in detail
the emotion that the wife brought to her testimony:
Without the use of the embryos, Sajel Patel will never be able to be the
mother of biological siblings – with all the joy and pain it can bring. She
will never be able to give her daughter a biological sibling. During the
hearing on this issue, Sajel Patel often was tearful. Her testimony was a
plea for an award to her. Her inability to have additional children clearly
weighs heavily on her.213
The woman’s desire to have a child is also often rooted specifically in their desire
to have a biological child and to be pregnant themselves.214 The Reber court wrote at
length about the difference, stating:

207. See Purvis & Blanco, supra note 139, at 1513.
208. See Appleton, supra note 31, at 301.
209. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
210. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
211. Id. at 1162.
212. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 692 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019), as amended (June 6, 2019),
opinion vacated in part, 456 P.3d 13 (2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020).
213. Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7,
2017).
214. But see Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 449, 459 (1993)
(“Male sperm donors, I will suggest, are considered to be “pregnant persons” and, not
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There is no question that the ability to have a biological child and/or be
pregnant is a distinct experience from adoption. Thus, simply because
adoption or foster parenting may be available to Wife, it does not mean
that such options should be given equal weight in a balancing test.
Adoption is a laudable, wonderful, and fulfilling experience for those
wishing to experience parenthood, but there is no question that it
occupies a different place for a woman than the opportunity to be
pregnant and/or have a biological child. As a matter of science,
traditional adoption does not provide a woman with the opportunity to
be pregnant.215
There are some limits to such claims. Courts often referenced the difference
between a woman’s desire to have any children and a woman’s desire to have more
children, treating the latter as a weaker interest. Sometimes the reference was
oblique, such as the Terrell court describing the desire to “become a parent” rather
than “have another child” or something more expansive.216 But sometimes the
discussion was explicit, as in the Rooks court explaining specifically that the wife in
that case “has already borne three children,” noting that she was not like the women
in Davis, Szafranski, or Reber, “where the woman's only opportunity to bear children
would be foreclosed if the court did not award the embryos to her.”217 Similarly, in
rejecting the wife’s claim in McQueen, the court explained that the wife’s right to
procreate did not extend to a right to procreate with her ex-husband through use of
stored embryos, in part because “the parties did not begin the process of IVF because
McQueen had any infertility issues and McQueen has been able to achieve
parenthood.”218
The difference is highlighted by contrasting with women who sought to donate
embryos rather than use the embryos themselves. The Davis court was faced with
such a scenario and stated outright that the decision “would be closer” if the ex-wife
wanted to use the embryos herself and if that use was her only “reasonable means”
of becoming a parent.219 The court went on to state:
[We] recognize the trauma that Mary Sue has already experienced and
the additional discomfort to which she would be subjected if she opts to
attempt IVF again. Still, she would have a reasonable opportunity,
through IVF, to try once again to achieve parenthood in all its aspects—
genetic, gestational, bearing, and rearing.220

surprisingly, these pregnant male persons are treated much better than pregnant female
persons.”).
215. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1138–39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
216. Terrell, 438 P.3d at 690.
217. In re Marriage of Rooks, 488 P.3d 116, 122 (Colo. App. 2016), rev’d, 429 P.3d 579
(Colo. 2018).
218. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 145–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
219. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992
WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
220. Id.
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This is not to say that these women’s desire to be parents is not deeply held or that
their emotional desire is not valid. But there is a striking contrast to how men’s
emotional arguments are not credited by courts. The husband in Reber explained his
opposition to his ex-wife using their stored embryos by referencing his own history
as an adopted child who never knew his biological father.221 Although the court
acknowledged his concern as “not unreasonable,” it found that his ex-wife’s
statement that she would allow him “to be involved in the child’s life, if he so desires”
eliminated his worry.222 The court did not acknowledge the realities of what this
might look like: joint custody shared with a woman he had spent considerable time
suing, with a lengthy and public record of his initial position that he did not want the
child born at all. Instead, the wife’s promise to allow him some amount of
involvement was credited—just as the court also credited her statement that she
would “do her best” to promise that she would not seek child support from her exhusband, a promise that is unenforceable under the law.223
One of the most striking rejections of a man’s emotions took place in Szafranski.
The male partner in question, Jacob, sent an email to his ex-partner laying bare his
fears about what genetic parenthood would mean for his life and other family
relationships in the future:
I just am afraid that this will be something that haunts me for the rest of
my life and that once I do find someone who I’m ready to love and have
a family with they will reject me on the basis that I could potentially have
a child of my own in the world with another women [sic], that I know
nothing about and neither of which have I ever loved. The thought of a
child being a mutually desired choice in the shared life and relationship
of two loving adults is something very fundamental and non-negotiable
to some people. I just wonder if my future happiness in life will be
tethered to the women [sic] I cared for years ago and the child I never
knew.224
His worries were not merely hypothetical: he had dated a woman who was surprised
and unhappy to learn that his ex-girlfriend might have access to embryos created with
his sperm and told him that she would break up with him if the embryos were going
to be developed.225 Yet the court minimized his concern by “observ[ing] that many
of Jacob’s cited concerns were risks that both parties faced and knowingly accepted
in agreeing to undergo IVF.”226 The court reinforced a lower court’s finding that his
concerns were “speculative.”227 Then, after noting that it did not want to “diminish[]
Jacob’s valid concern,” the court declared that it would “not give weight to the
judgments of those who have no direct interest in this controversy.”228 But Jacob was

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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not asking the court to decide the fate of the embryos based upon his later girlfriend’s
judgment—he was arguing that his future life and happiness would be impacted.
The Patel court also rejected a man’s worries around the potential use of embryos.
In that case, the couple had one child when the wife was diagnosed with breast
cancer.229 Because her treatment would likely affect her fertility, they went through
IVF, even though they already disagreed about whether or not to have more
children.230 The two had not discussed what to do with embryos if they divorced and
only realized they would need to specify a disposition when they were given
documents to sign immediately before the egg retrieval.231 After an initial decision
that the wife would control them, the husband said he was not comfortable with that
plan and would not move forward with the procedures unless they specified that the
embryos would be destroyed in the case of divorce.232 After the wife’s treatment, the
two divorced, and the wife argued that the embryos represented her only chance to
have another biological child.233 In opposition, the husband pointed to several
concerns, including the effect that another child would have on their daughter, the
risks inherent in the procedure and pregnancy that might leave his daughter without
a mother, and the prospect of engaging in a second custody battle.234 As with
Szafranski, the court reasoned that these were “risks present when he agreed to the
IVF” and thus dismissed his worries about his daughter.235
Courts have also rejected at least two men who wanted embryos donated to other
couples based on their beliefs that the embryos were human life. One such man
described “many long and serious discussions regarding the . . . moral and ethical
repercussions” of IVF treatment.236 He testified that his religious faith meant that
using IVF was a “dilemma” and that he and his then-wife “agreed that no matter what
happened the eggs would be either utilized by us or by other infertile couples.”237
Similarly, in Dahl the husband testified that he believed that embryos were human
life and wished to donate the embryos to other couples because “there’s no pain
greater than having participated in the demise of your own child.”238 In both cases,
courts rejected the men’s argument and directed that the embryos be discarded. The
only example of a court giving control over embryos to a male partner over the
objections of his female ex-partner who wanted the embryos to be destroyed was in
a case in which only the male partner was genetically related to the embryos, which
had been created using donated eggs.239

229. Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7,
2017).
230. Id.
231. Id. at *1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
237. Id.
238. In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 837 (Or. 2008).
239. See In re Marriage of Nash, No. 62553-5-I, 2009 WL 1514842, at *4–7 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 1, 2009).
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This rejection or dismissal of men’s emotional concerns is not universal. A few
courts reference the emotional240 or psychological241 consequences of unwanted
fatherhood. But such acknowledgments typically come outside of the context of the
modern balancing approach. McQueen, which acknowledges the ex-husband’s
concern that he and his ex-wife could not co-parent more children given the
difficulties they had co-parenting their existing children242 and the “possible life-long
emotional, psychological, and financial responsibilities,”243 used the rule of
contemporaneous mutual consent, not a balancing test.244 Terrell, which noted the
man’s concerns that the contentious breakup would mean that he could never have a
significant relationship with his child,245 used the contractual approach. Even the
Davis court, which credited Junior Davis’s description of how terrible an emotional
impact his father’s absence had in his life after his family dissolved and he was sent
to a Lutheran home for boys,246 did not weigh his interest in not procreating against
his ex-wife’s desire to use the embryos herself but rather her desire to donate them
to another couple.
Nothing about embryo dispute cases lends itself to bright-line rules. There is a
pattern, however, that courts describe, quote, and rely upon women’s descriptions of
their emotions, and particularly the emotional harm of being denied a chance to
become a mother, while they minimize men’s descriptions of the emotional harm of
being forced to become a father, of knowing embryos were destroyed when he
believes that to be murder, or the impact of pursuing IVF pregnancy upon his existing
child. This difference is merely rhetorical if the court ultimately resolves the dispute
by enforcing an agreement between the couple or by requiring contemporaneous
mutual consent. The balancing approach is different: it expressly weighs the interests
of the litigants against each other. A court that credits a woman’s emotional appeal
that conforms to gendered stereotypes about women’s desires to be mothers, yet
dismisses a man’s emotional appeal, turns the balancing test from an assessment of
interests into a tool reinforcing sexist prejudice.
Courts have consistently dismissed men’s emotions in both embryo disposition
disputes and treatment of men’s consent to sexual activity that led to pregnancy. The
legal treatment of consent in each circumstance, however, is different. The next
section turns to this inconsistency.
B. The Inconsistent Recognition of Men’s Intent
A second dilemma presented by embryo disputes has to do with how the law
views men’s intent to become fathers. As described above, in the context of sexual

240. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
241. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992
WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
242. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 136.
243. Id. at 147.
244. Id. at 158.
245. Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681, 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019), as amended (June 6, 2019),
review granted in part (Aug. 27, 2019), opinion vacated in part, 248 Ariz. 47, 456 P.3d 13
(2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020).
246. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603–04.
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reproduction, the law simply does not care what a man’s intent was at the time of
conception. There is certainly no requirement that he intend to be a father, and there
are plenty of examples where there is not even a requirement that he intend to have
sex. Yet the mere existence of a child is deemed sufficient to trigger parental status
and responsibilities, regardless of his intentions at the time of conception.
If the same logic held, then a man who changed his mind regarding disposition of
stored embryos should be ignored. After all, if a man who engages in sexual
intercourse is bound to accept the risk of his decision, surely the changed mind of a
man who participated in the creation of the embryos with the express goal of
pregnancy should be similarly bound to his past decision?
Some women have made this argument in litigation, but the majority of courts to
address it have refused to view consent to enter IVF treatment as perpetual consent
to reproduce. The Patel court is a counterexample, noting that the couple “endured
the expensive and invasive IVF procedure” with the intent of having another child.247
The Reber trial court found that the husband “implicitly agreed to procreate with
Wife when he agreed to undergo IVF, signed the consent form, provided sperm for
the creation of the pre-embryos, and agreed to the fertilization causing the preembryos to be created. The use of the pre-embryos was never made contingent upon
the parties remaining married.”248 The appellate court agreed, noting that “the only
reason one undergoes IVF is to have a child. Clearly, Husband knew the potential
result of his participation in IVF was going to be a child at some point in the
future.”249 The dissent in McQueen similarly reasons that by “knowingly and
voluntarily” going through IVF, “they made the reproductive decision that the
majority asserts has yet to be made.”250
More typical is the Davis court’s dismissal of an argument that the parties had an
“implied contract to reproduce using in vitro fertilization” that should be enforced
even after their divorce.251 The Fabos court explicitly rejected “[the] wife’s argument
that [the] husband waived his right to avoid procreating when he agreed to create the
pre-embryos through IVF.”252 That court cited Rooks, which noted that “[w]e do not
interpret a party’s commencement of the IVF process, on its own, to establish the
party’s automatic consent to become the genetic parent of all possible children that
could result from successful implantation of the pre-embryos.”253 The Witten court
dismissed the wife’s framing of her ex-husband being “allowed to back out of his
agreement to have children.”254 The most abrupt dismissal appears in Roman v.
Roman, in which the court notes that the ex-wife argued that her ex-husband
“breached the intent and purpose of the IVF agreements” but rejects her arguments

247. Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7,
2017).
248. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
249. Id.
250. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (Dowd, J.,
dissenting).
251. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992
WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
252. In re Marriage of Fabos & Olsen, 451 P.3d 1218, 1224 (Colo. App. 2019).
253. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 592 (Colo. 2018)).
254. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003).
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out of hand, stating the ex-wife “does not cite any argument or authority for this
proposition. Therefore, we will not consider it on appeal.”255
Obviously, there are significant differences between a sexual interaction that leads
to pregnancy and the intentional creation of embryos that are in a freezer rather than
developing in a woman’s uterus. But these differences are precisely the point: the
inconsistent treatment of men’s intent in the two contexts demonstrates that the law
does not view embryos as persons and that the bodily autonomy of a pregnant person
should be understood to simply outweigh anyone else’s desire to continue or
terminate her pregnancy. The inconsistency in treatment of men, in other words,
strengthens feminist arguments in favor of an individual woman’s right to abortion.
First, it is clear that a majority of jurisdictions and courts do not view stored
embryos as persons. As discussed above, there have been some efforts with isolated
success to legislate treatment of embryos as persons and to forbid their destruction.
But the end result of this will likely simply be more frozen embryos, not more
children.
The goal for such programs is embryo adoption, a concept pioneered in 1997.
Marlene Strege was diagnosed with premature ovarian failure, meaning that she
could not be a genetic parent. One option would have been to use a donor egg
fertilized with her husband’s sperm, but they preferred not to create an unequal
biological link between each parent and child, so they instead “adopted” an embryo
that Marlene carried to term.256 Since then, Nightlight Christian Adoptions has
created the Snowflakes Program, devoted to promoting and facilitating embryo
adoption.257 The Snowflakes Program is explicit about its personhood viewpoint,
stating on its website that “[w]hen the egg and sperm are joined a new life has been
created.”258 Such adoptions are administered more like the adoption of a child than
donation of gametes. The organization screens potential adopting couples by
conducting home studies and other measures similar to those that take place for
potential adoptive parents.259 The couple donating their embryos is also allowed to
select and even meet the potential recipient of the embryos.260
President George W. Bush promoted embryo adoption in the early 2000s,261 and
since then the Department of Health and Human Services has supported such efforts,

255. 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006).
256. Noah Geldberg, Zygote Zeitgeist: Legal Complexities in the Expanding Practice of
Embryo Donation, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 813, 819 (2016).
257. See Katz, supra note 9, at 191.
CHRISTIAN
ADOPTIONS,
258. What
is
Embryo
Adoption?,
NIGHTLIGHT
https://nightlight.org/snowflakes-embryo-adoption-donation/what-is-embryo-adoption/
[https://perma.cc/C9Z8-LVWW].
259. Eric Blyth, Lucy Frith, Marilyn S. Paul & Roni Berger; Embryo Relinquishment for
Family Building: How Should It be Conceptualised? 25 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 260, 265
(2011); see also Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos as America’s Prospective
Adoptees: Are Couples Truly “Adopting” or Merely Transferring Property Rights?, 16 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 141 (2009).
260. See Blyth et al., supra note 259, at 265.
261. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1015, 1030 (2010).
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creating an Embryo Adoption Awareness program262 that has administered grants to
organizations including the Snowflakes Program.263 Despite this support, the
numbers of such adoptions seem to be low. Counts vary, ranging from 128 embryo
adoptions in 2006,264 to fewer than 250 children alive as of 2010 who had been born
through an embryo adoption,265 to the relative high point claiming about 400 births
per year in 2012.266 Couples going through IVF also seem to disfavor donating their
embryos to other families, generally choosing it the least frequently as the ultimate
disposition of any surplus embryos.267 And as mentioned previously, if a couple
successfully has a child through IVF, their ability to think of additional, stored
embryos as siblings for their child makes them less likely to be willing to donate
those embryos.268
Instead, IVF occupies an uneasy position, somewhat under the radar, of
antiabortion rhetoric that would treat any fertilized egg as human life. It is very clear
as a conceptual matter that if a fertilized egg is a person, then IVF is at best a
dystopian procedure in which people are created to live in stasis indefinitely.269 Yet
for the most part, IVF has not become part of the abortion debates.270 It is one thing
to characterize women seeking abortions as irresponsible; it is another to deny people
yearning for children access to a leading treatment method that could lead to a
successful childbirth.271
Second, the time between creating embryos and actually implanting them allows
for a moment of decision that sexual reproduction does not. For couples who have
intercourse and become pregnant, there is no opportunity to specifically decide
whether to move forward with the pregnancy (for the man, at least). IVF provides a
moment of redecision, confirming that the original intent to create a child is still
present.272 If we really meant to make people liable for all the obligations of

262. About EAA, OFFICE OF POPULATION AFFS., https://opa.hhs.gov/grantprograms/embryo-adoption-awareness-eaa/about-eaa [https://perma.cc/U866-TFSR]; see also
Embryo Adoption Awareness Program, HHS OFFICE OF POPULATION AFFS.,
https://opa.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/embryo-adoption-awareness-program-50th2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3QU-4WN5].
263. Mary Ziegler, Beyond Balancing: Rethinking the Law of Embryo Disposition, 68 AM.
U. L. REV. 515, 520–21 (2018).
264. Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 336–37 (2006).
265. Blyth et al., supra 259, at 265.
266. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 377 (2012).
267. Blyth et al., supra note 259, at 266.
268. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
269. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 261, at 1019; Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion:
Why the Personhood Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 573,
601–14 (2013); see also Anthony Jose Sirven, Undue Process: A Father’s Proprietary Interest
in an Embryo and Its Clash with Casey, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1469 (2016) (comparing abortion to
embryo disposition to argue that abortion deprives men of property without due process).
270. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 261, at 1022, 1024.
271. Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 101, 108–09 (2003).
272. See Robertson, supra note 4, at 454 (“When early embryos are or might be placed in
the woman’s body, the locus of authority over disposition of the embryo is easily
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parenthood because they had engaged in behavior that might lead to pregnancy, we
would never allow anyone to back out of implanting embryos. The fact that the trend
has been to allow people to change their mind demonstrates that the real point of no
return in reproduction is pregnancy.
Embryo disputes highlight the role of a pregnant woman’s rights in a unique way,
because it is otherwise unusual to be able to split off a claimed right not to be a parent
from the bodily rights of the pregnant woman. Some self-professed men’s rights
activists, for example, have argued that gender equality demands they have an exit
from parenthood, but even they rarely argue that a pregnant woman should be forced
to have an abortion. Instead, they have proposed measures such as relieving a man
of future child support obligations if he provides his sexual partner with funds
sufficient to pay for an abortion.273 Other attempts to reason through abortion
decisions use thought experiments around artificial wombs.274
Some of the courts faced with embryo disputes have highlighted this difference.
The Davis court, for example, noted that “[n]one of the concerns about a woman’s
bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion
decisions is applicable here.” 275 The ex-husband in Szafranski attempted to derive a
right to control the embryos from his ex-wife’s abortion right—as the court described
it, he “derived a right for him to unilaterally prohibit the use of a pre-embryo created
with his sperm and appellee’s egg, without regard to appellee’s interests in the preembryo, from the fact that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy.”276 The court rejected this argument as “without basis,”277 rebuffing the
comparison.
Disputes over stored embryos thus create a paradox relating to men’s consent to
become fathers—irrelevant in the context of sexual reproduction, but significant in
the context of stored embryos—and point towards an explanation underlying the
inconsistency—the autonomy rights of pregnant women. The lesson from men’s
intent is that pro-choice advocates should be talking about IVF and stored embryos
more.

answered . . . . The locus of decisional authority, however, is less clear when the early embryo
is outside of the body.”).
273. See Dara E. Purvis, Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 330, 333–34 (2015); see also Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, supra note 31, at
294.
274. See, e.g., Julia Dalzell, The Impact of Artificial Womb Technology on Abortion
Jurisprudence, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 327, 346 (2019); Jennifer S.
Hendricks, Not of Woman Born: A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 399 (2011).
See also Stephen G. Gilles, Does the Right to Elective Abortion Include the Right to Ensure
the Death of the Fetus?, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1009, 1066 (2015).
275. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992
WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
276. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
277. Id.
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IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The inconsistent treatment of men’s consent as illuminated by comparing the two
contexts of embryo disputes and nonconsensual parenthood through statutory rape
thus highlights two related issues: the uneven treatment of men’s and women’s
emotions in embryo disposition disputes and the unacknowledged proof that courts
already reject a personhood theory of embryos. The Conclusion outlines practical
implications from these lessons, pointing to how embryo disputes should be resolved,
how to change the abortion debate, and broader implications for family law.
A. How to Solve Disputes Over Stored Embryos
The masculinities lens, turned towards embryo disputes, generates several
lessons. First, the modern trend towards broader adoption of the balancing approach
is fatally flawed. Assessing and comparing men’s and women’s interests in parenting
versus not becoming parents is inextricably tangled up in gendered stereotypes about
fatherhood and motherhood, as well as hegemonic masculinity’s rejection of the
concept of men’s emotions. Contemporaneous mutual consent, by contrast, simply
ignores the emotions and preferences of both partners in favor of giving both partners
a constant veto power over the other’s ability to use stored embryos.
This leaves the contractual approach as the “least worst” option. The contractual
approach has several elements in its favor: it at least allows for the possibility of each
partner to weigh their own preferences and emotions around parenthood and
memorialize their plans in the agreement. Family law, in general, has embraced
private agreements in other contexts such as premarital and separation agreements,
and scholars such as Deborah Forman278 and Mary Ziegler279 have looked to other
family law agreements as models for reforms to agreements regarding embryos.
Literature analyzing such agreements also provides a foundation to assess and
criticize existing embryo disposition agreements. Melvin Eisenberg’s seminal article
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract shows how badly individuals in
the real world conform to traditional expectations around rational actors, given our
inability to predict future events, behavior, and preferences.280 Specifically, people
are far too optimistic, particularly about how stable their personal relationships with
a spouse or partner are.281 This optimism exists in spite of awareness about the overall
stability of relationships—for example, Eisenberg cites a survey in which
respondents accurately predicted the overall risk of divorce at fifty percent, yet
estimated their own individual risk of divorce as zero.282 As Eisenberg describes it,
using the term “thick relationships” to mean personally significant relationships:

278. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A
Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 380 (2013).
279. See Mary Ziegler, Beyond Balancing: Rethinking the Law of Embryo Disposition, 68
AM. U. L. REV. 515, 559 (2018).
280. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995).
281. See id. at 216; see also Ziegler, supra note 263, at 561.
282. See Eisenberg, supra note 280, at 217.
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The nature of thick relationships makes it virtually impossible to predict,
at the time the contract is made, the contingencies that may affect the
relationship’s future course. Furthermore, at the time the contract is
made, each party is likely to be unduly optimistic about the relationship’s
long-term prospects and the willingness of the other party to avoid
opportunistic behavior or unfair manipulation of the relevant contractual
rules as the relationship unfolds. Finally, because of defects in capability
the parties are likely to give undue weight to the state of their relationship
as of the time the contract is made, which is vivid, concrete, and
instantiated; to erroneously take the state of their relationship at that point
as representative of the relationship’s future; and to give too little thought
to and put too little weight on the risk that the relationship will go bad.283
Although Eisenberg was thinking of premarital agreements, the same reasoning
applies to the agreements presented to couples seeking IVF. Couples seeking IVF
procedures are thinking of the hope of becoming parents and their long-term dreams
for such a family. It seems a safe assumption that no couple seeks IVF expecting the
relationship to end, particularly before the IVF treatment is successful in resulting in
a viable pregnancy.
Unlike the fatally flawed balancing approach, however, the contractual approach
has a path for improvement. Thoughtful reform can, in the words of Brian Bix,
“protect parties from most of the forms of unfairness that tend to result from . . .
agreements, and still provide parties who have a good faith desire to order their own
domestic lives with the necessary legal powers to do so.”284 A number of scholars
have proposed importing protections developed in the context of premarital
agreements into embryo disposition agreements. Deborah Forman, for example,
would require that all such agreements be in writing and signed in consultation with
an attorney, as well as include a waiting period between when the agreement is
executed and when the medical procedure takes place to give participants time to
reflect on their choices.285 Mary Ziegler looks to proposed reforms of the Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act to similarly focus on each intended parent
having access to independent counsel to advise them on the agreement as well as
clearly-conveyed information about the significance of each possible option in
determining control of stored embryos.286
These procedural issues with embryo disposition agreements are low-hanging
fruit in that there are obvious issues with the rushed and relatively uninformed way
that paperwork is presented to couples that can be addressed with direct legislative
intervention. There are a variety of ways to build in more time for couples to reflect
upon their decision and to ensure they receive clear explanations of what choices
they are to be presented with. It seems obvious to require that an embryo disposition
agreement be completed in writing before a fertility treatment provider proceeds with
IVF procedures, for example. Providers should also be required to provide direct

283. Id. at 251–52.
284. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 146 (1998).
285. See Forman, supra note 278, at 434–35.
286. See Ziegler, supra note 279, at 565.
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language flagging the consequences of each disposition choice.287 It would also be a
significant improvement to break up the many consent forms and agreements so that
couples are not surprised by having to decide the long-term disposition plan for any
stored embryos while they sign medical consent forms immediately before a
procedure begins. Questions regarding the disposition of embryos are typically
presented to intended parents along with numerous other documents relating to the
medical aspects of the IVF procedures. States could enact procedural protections
requiring fertility clinics to present those documents separately and earlier than other
documents.
More significantly, legislatures might require a certain period of time in between
executing the agreement and undergoing IVF treatment. The time given to couples
to consider a premarital agreement often has a significant impact on whether consent
to the agreement is considered voluntary. An engaged person presented with a
premarital agreement the morning of their wedding day, for example, is not simply
faced with reading, understanding, and potentially negotiating a substantial legal
document: if they fail to come to an agreement in a short period of time they suffer
the personal embarrassment and financial harm of cancelling their wedding.288
Couples who receive a stack of forms to fill out the morning of a procedure are faced
with a similarly intense time pressure,289 with little need for such a rush. Legislation
could require a period of time in between giving patients the documents and when
they are signed to guarantee a period of time when the intended parents can
contemplate the decision, absent extenuating circumstances making a more rushed
process necessary.
Several scholars have proposed requiring independent legal counsel or
psychological counseling for both potential intended parents. Here, masculinities
theories provide an additional justification for some form of counseling, although
with more of a focus on family counseling or personal emotional work as opposed to
legal advice. Decisions about the disposition of embryos raise deep questions about
parenting that most people seeking IVF treatment have not yet had to confront. An
intended parent is asked to weigh their own desire to become a parent, their partner’s
desire to become a parent, their feelings about genetic children with whom they
might not share a personal or even legal relationship, and how those feelings might
change over time, including as they do or don’t have successful pregnancies with
their partner. These are all emotional issues to wrestle with and getting a clear sense
of such preferences is even harder when one has grown up in a society that tells boys
and men that it is inappropriate and not manly to talk through their emotions. Some
kind of counseling, either conducted by a psychologist or a licensed therapist, would
help to ensure that each party to an embryo disposition agreement has given such
decisions the thoughtful consideration they deserve.290

287. See Carissa Pryor, What to Expect When Contracting for Embryos, 62 ARIZ. L. REV.
1095, 1111–12 (2020).
288. See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A
Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 90–91 (2011).
289. See supra note 9.
290. One might ask, as an incisive commenter did, whether such counseling would only be
necessary for intended parents containing at least one man, if the justification for needing
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The proposals thus far have concentrated on the initial execution of the embryo
disposition agreement. If such agreements are to capture the meaningful consent of
the participants, however, the parties should be encouraged or even required to revisit
that consent as time passes and allowed to change their minds as memorialized in the
agreement. The agreements could build in cues, for example, to revisit disposition
plans after specified periods of time or events: after every attempt at implantation of
stored embryos, whether the attempt results in a viable pregnancy or not, and in the
absence of implantations after specified time periods such as once per year. Such
reevaluations of disposition plans should not be necessary to renew the original
agreement—if a couple revisits their plans and realizes that one person wants to
change the plans and the other does not, this later disagreement should not void the
original agreement. To do so would destabilize the agreement and function like a
modified requirement of contemporaneous mutual consent. If such a disagreement
were to arise, however, being aware of the disagreement might save later litigation
or frustration. For example, being alerted earlier that their partner would not allow
them to control embryo disposition might give someone more time to try a second
egg retrieval. Furthermore, prompting reevaluations would allow partners to evaluate
how ongoing events change their preferences, such as shifting disposition from one
party’s control to destroying them if a successful pregnancy led the partners to view
the embryos in a more individualized way.
In addition, two more substantive changes to how disposition agreements operate
could allow more flexibility and equity in how the consent of the potential intended
parents is assessed. First, a reoccurring argument throughout many of the stored
embryo cases is the higher investment of the person whose eggs are used in the IVF
process as compared to the person whose sperm is used. The process of retrieving
eggs is much more physically and mentally burdensome on the partner with ova than
on the partner whose sperm is used, and many litigants argued that the suffering they
went through to create the stored embryos justified giving them control over the
remaining embryos. In addition, although societal perceptions of diminishing female
fertility versus more permanent male fertility are overblown, many of the litigants
had persuasive evidence to show that the stored embryos represented their last
opportunity to be a genetic parent. People having eggs retrieved could opt to freeze
the eggs themselves rather than the embryos, but frozen embryos have a higher rate
of success in leading to births than frozen eggs do, so people at the outset of their
fertility journey are forced to weigh the chances of becoming a parent against the
chances of their relationship ending when deciding whether to freeze eggs or
embryos.
One response to this different burden put forward by scholars is to propose that in
disputes between members of an opposite-sex couple, the woman receive control
over the embryos.291 Such a bright-line rule is problematic for a few reasons,

greater prods to consider the emotions of parenthood is that men are taught by hegemonic
masculinity not to acknowledge emotion. Although hegemonic masculinity affects men the
most, norms of masculinity and shortcomings of the contractual process around IVF operate
such that even a pair of female intended parents would likely benefit from such a process.
Indeed, all parents would likely benefit from such advance discussions, but only in the context
of ART is such an intervention widely feasible.
291. Marina Merjan, Rethinking the “Force” Behind “Forced Procreation”: The Case for
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however. For one, it offers no ability for a couple to customize their choices, should
the couple agree at the outset to a different plan. More globally, although the
published embryo dispute cases involve opposite-sex couples, people in same-sex
relationships face both social and medical infertility and are frequent users of IVF.
Additionally, transgender men and nonbinary people may have ova and choose to be
the partner from whom eggs are harvested, and any use of gendered language
excludes them. Finally, such a firm preference risks underscoring gendered
presumptions about mothers being the real, natural parent as compared to fathers, the
more reluctant and more disposable parent.
That said, it is true that the person from whom eggs are harvested must undergo
an intrusive and often painful process. Additionally, private agreements within
family law are often criticized for allowing or even facilitating men in opposite-sex
couples to use their greater resources or legal sophistication to exploit their women
partners.
Reflecting upon masculinities theories gives a third option. Masculinities
recognizes the harm that hegemonic masculinity works upon people of all genders
by imposing a single vision of manhood and fatherhood. Leaving couples to assess
and negotiate their own agreements aids the hegemonic man in some ways by
encouraging strategic actors, competition, and dominance of one party over the other.
Setting the default with the person from whom eggs are harvested but allowing for
negotiated changes to that default strikes a balance that respects biological
differences without giving voice to gendered stereotypes.
A legislature could set the default as giving sole control over stored embryos to
the person from whom eggs were harvested, from which couples going through IVF
could deviate through the agreement. At the moment, to the extent states specify a
default, it is to give shared control to both partners. For example, Florida law states
that “[a]bsent a written agreement, decisionmaking authority regarding the
disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the commissioning couple.”292 A
statute could similarly specify “absent a written agreement, decision-making
authority regarding the disposition of preembryos shall reside with the person from
whom eggs were removed, if that person is not an egg donor who is not an intended
parent of the preembryos.”
Finally, the embryo disposition agreement could allow couples to change their
status and legal relationship to the embryos over time. Specifically, consent to use of
the embryos could be split away from legal status as a parent, with the ensuing
obligations and rights. A couple entering the IVF process could thus agree that
Person A would have sole decision-making power over later use of the embryos, but
if Person A chose to implant embryos without the contemporaneous consent of
Person B, Person B would have the option to effectively revert to the status of gamete
donor.
This option provides significantly more flexibility than existing agreements. It
also allows for more customization that acknowledges the different potential harms
of unwanted parenthood, allowing an individual to set different levels of opposition

Giving Women Exclusive Decisional Authority over Their Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 737, 766 (2015).
292. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2020).
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to unwanted legal parenthood and unwanted genetic parenthood. Importantly, this
breaks apart use of the embryos and the obligations of legal parenthood, particularly
financial obligations of support. As discussed above, courts hearing embryo
disposition disputes have been quick to dismiss the emotional concerns of men
opposing use of embryos and often reduce their objections to a worry about child
support. With this option available as partners decide embryo disposition plans, they
can each weigh whether they want to have the ability to absolutely block use of
embryos in the future, allow use of the embryos only if they are not the legal parent,
or allow use of the embryos without restriction. By breaking apart the use of the
embryos and the ensuing obligations, particularly the financial obligations, it
facilitates a more frank assessment of preferences on the part of both partners.
Although disclaiming parental status is not easily done in most contexts of family
law, the concept operationalizes an instinct courts facing embryo disposition disputes
have voiced by emphasizing where the partner wanting to use stored embryos has
stated their intent not to pursue their ex-partner for child support.293 It also fits into
an existing framework of the law of legal parentage, by allowing people to convert
their status from potential legal parent to egg or sperm donor. This would not be
allowed if a pregnancy had already commenced, but because the decision would be
made before a stored embryo was implanted, the context of assisted reproductive
technology is consistent with other treatment of donors.
The flexibility that is allowed by making such decisions before pregnancy begins
leads into the second set of implications arising from the significance of pregnancy,
particularly in the context of abortion. The next section turns to the abortion debate,
and why embryos and IVF have a more central role than previously contemplated.
B. Abortion and Embryos
Assisted reproductive technologies, particularly IVF and frozen embryos,
challenge rhetoric around abortion. The different treatment of frozen embryos as
compared to existing pregnancies demonstrates a rejection of the personhood
perspective that would treat embryos as legal persons. Every court that has not been
explicitly instructed by law to treat embryos as persons has instead treated them as
property, albeit a particularly emotionally fraught type of property that represents
much more than simple monetary value to the people fighting over it.
This rejection is significant not simply to show a greater judicial consensus than
has previously been recognized, but also to give a more accurate and more
complicated frame to the abortion debate. Certainly, the most ardent pro-life activists
view embryos as human life to the extent that the destruction of a frozen embryo is
akin to murder. But this group does not represent the broader American public, even
the portion of Americans who would describe themselves as anti-abortion. In a 2013
Pew Research Center survey, forty-nine percent of respondents believed that
abortion is morally wrong, but only twelve percent believed the same about IVF.294

293. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“She
maintains that she does not expect Jacob to support any child born from the pre-embryos.”).
294. Joseph Liu, Abortion Viewed in Moral Terms: Fewer See Stem Cell Research and IVF
as Moral Issues, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 15, 2013), https://www.pewforum.org/2013/08/15/
abortion-viewed-in-moral-terms/#morality-of-using-in-vitro-fertilization
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In 2011, a personhood amendment in Mississippi that initially garnered support from
over eighty percent of the electorate was thoroughly defeated, in part because
activists flagged its potential impact on IVF services.295 Despite efforts to
destigmatize abortion, current popular discourse fails to see abortion care as one part
of a broader interaction between reproductive healthcare and family life.296 Including
embryos, IVF, and the prospect of denying IVF to people yearning to become parents
in the discussion of the impact of abortion restrictions is more accurate and more
compelling to people who otherwise take anti-choice positions.
Additionally, recognizing the contrasting treatment of men’s consent in the
context of IVF versus sexual reproduction highlights that the autonomy of the
pregnant person is dispositive. The only reason that IVF allows for more recognition
of intent or consent to become a parent is that no one is pregnant when consent is
evaluated. A particularly pernicious strain of anti-abortion and anti-feminist rhetoric
is to argue that if pregnant people can opt out of parenthood by terminating the
pregnancy, men should also be able to opt out of the financial obligations of child
support.297 Although the argument seems laughable at first exposure, men’s rights
groups have made it in court, arguing that child support violates the Equal Protection
Clause.298
This argument, though it was cast as “Roe v. Wade for men,” illustrates the
pervasive nature of hegemonic masculinity.299 This view of the “harm” of unwanted
fatherhood sees it as a purely financial injury, rather than the deeper emotional
complexities described by litigants in embryo disposition disputes. It also casts the
right to privacy and the bodily autonomy of the pregnant person in the competitive
lens of hegemonic masculinity, in which any right that can be asserted by the
pregnant person has a corresponding loss inflicted on their male sexual partner.
Centering the pregnant person in the context of unwanted pregnancies, and
correspondingly recognizing the absence of a person in a similar position in embryo
disputes, removes the framing of hegemonic masculinity. Instead of an unacceptable
victory of the pregnant woman over a man,300 acknowledging the dispositive rights
of the pregnant person during their pregnancy moves discussion away from a
gendered battle and towards a more rational analysis.
C. Embryo Disputes and Family Law
Finally, although frozen embryo disputes are uncommon in terms of raw numbers,
they have implications that reverberate throughout how family law views legal
parentage. Explanations of why men’s consent is irrelevant for purposes of child

[https://perma.cc/T3QU-4WN5].
295. See Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood Movement Implicates
Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 573, 584–85 (2013).
296. Cf. Greer Donley, Parental Autonomy over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, 105
MINN. L. REV. 175 (2020).
297. Purvis, supra note 273, at 333.
298. Id. at 334.
299. Id.
300. I use the gendered framing of hegemonic masculinity here descriptively, as
hegemonic masculinity is also transphobic and rests upon a belief in only two genders.
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support, such as in the context of statutory rape, generally focus on the child’s needs.
The logic is whatever the circumstances of conception may be, the child requires
support, and the state’s privatization of dependency turns to the biological parents as
the source of that support.
Embryo disputes, however, illustrate that the logic outlined above does not
actually hold true. Instead, no matter the circumstances of conception, a man does
not have the right to interfere in a pregnant person’s control of their own body. This
has two broader implications: first, it prompts reexamination of how and why the law
imposes child support duties. If the law were to more explicitly acknowledge that the
dispositive issue is the autonomy of the pregnant person—not the needs of the
child—it potentially strengthens the argument that it is not always fair to impose
child support as the price for sex. Although a full discussion of child support
obligations imposed upon minors is beyond the focus of this Article, the contrasting
treatment of male consent flags how problematic such obligations are. Assessment
of the needs of vulnerable children and how society can meet those needs should not
treat the victims of crime as responsible for those needs as a consequence of sexual
activity. Doing so underscores harmful stereotypes about masculine sexuality that
are inaccurate and offensive when used to further victimize.
Second, it cues reexamination of the law’s conception of fatherhood from a new
perspective. The harm that courts most easily grasp in the context of unwanted
fatherhood is child support payments. But this is not the only harm that may come
from unwanted parenthood. Frozen embryo disputes should generate not only a
stronger recognition of men’s emotions around parenthood, but further questions
about how other aspects of family law reduce fatherhood to financial support.
CONCLUSION
When frozen embryo disputes are viewed in isolation, they appear to be extremely
specialized. Such disagreements only arise in a relatively specialized medical
circumstance, and the raw numbers and reported cases are both quite small. It might
be hard to imagine, at least on first exposure, that analysis of such litigation would
generate conclusions beyond an opinion about how to solve the very particular
problem of embryo disposition disputes.
Similarly, statutory rape of boys is a minority of statutory rape cases, and such
assaults are under-reported and under-prosecuted. Only a fraction of such events will
result in a pregnancy that is brought to term, and few challenges to paternity
determinations make their way into court.
When these two seemingly narrow corners of family law are set against each
other, however, the inconsistency in how the law treats consent to become a father is
striking. When that inconsistency is viewed through the lens of masculinities
theories, the threads of commonality become even easier to identify. From seemingly
discordant questions emerge far-reaching implications not only for how embryo
disposition disputes should be resolved, but broader issues of reproductive rights,
abortion, and the law’s conception of fatherhood.
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Case

Gender of
Judge

Goal of Male
Partner301

Goal of
Female
Partner

Rule Used

Prevailing
Party

Reber v.
Reiss302

Male

Discard

Use herself

Balance

Wife

Bilbao v.
Goodwin303

Male

Preserve or
donate

Destroy

Balance

Wife

Patel v.
Patel304

Female

Discard

Use

Balance

Wife

In re
Marriage of
Rooks305

Female

Discard

Use

K,306 then
balance

(Neither,
remand)

In re
Marriage of
Fabos and
Olsen307

Male

Discard

Donate

K, then
balance

Remand

Davis v.
Davis308

Female

Discard

Donate to
another
couple

K, then
balance

Husband

Szafranski v.
Dunston309

Male

Discard

Use

K, then
balance

Wife

J.B. v. M.B.310

Female

Donate to
infertile
couples

Discard

Contemp
MC

Wife

In re
Marriage of
Witten311

Female

Donate or
preserve

Use

Contemp
MC

Husband

AZ v. BZ312

Female

Discard

Use

Contemp
MC

Husband

301. None of the cases in this set involved a same-sex couple.
302. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
303. No. HHDFA166071615S, 2017 WL 5642280, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 217 A.3d 977 (Conn. 2019).
304. No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017).
305. 488 P.3d 116, 119 (Colo. App. 2016), rev’d, 429 P.3d 579, 588 (Colo. 2018).
306. K is short for contractual.
307. 451 P.3d 1218, 1224 (Colo. App. 2019).
308. 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), on reh’g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn.
Nov. 23, 1992).
309. 993 N.E.2d 502, 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
310. 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
311. 672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 2003).
312. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2000).
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Case

Gender of
Judge

Goal of Male
Partner313

Goal of
Female
Partner

Rule Used

Prevailing
Party

In re
Marriage of
Dahl and
Angle314

Male

Donate to
couple

Discard

K

Wife

Terrell v.
Torres315

Female

Discard or
donate

Use

K

Husband

Terrell v.
Torres316

Female

Donate to
another
couple

Use

K

Husband

Kass v.
Kass317

Female

Discard

Use

Enforces K

Husband

Roman v.
Roman318

Female

Discard

Use

Enforces K

Husband

McQueen v.
Gadberry319

Male

Discard (or
donate)

Use

Contemp
MC

Husband

K

Remanded
for evidence
as to
whether
embryos
were already
destroyed

Litowitz v.
Litowitz320

Male

Donate

Use

313. None of the cases in this set involved a same-sex couple.
314. 194 P.3d 834, 837 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
315. 438 P.3d 681, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019), as amended (June 6, 2019), vacated in part,
456 P.3d 13 (Ariz. 2020), as amended (Feb. 21, 2020).
316. 456 P.3d 13 (Ariz. 2020).
317. 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998).
318. 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006).
319. 507 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
320. 48 P.3d 261, 262 (Wash. 2002), amended sub nom., In re Marriage of Litowitz, 53
P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002).
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Goal of
Female
Partner

Rule Used

Prevailing
Party

Use

K

(Husband,
sort of)

Discard

Use

K, then
balance

Husband

Use

Discard

K

Husband

Gender of
Judge

Goal of Male
Partner321

Cahill v.
Cahill322

Male

Give
ownership to
the
University of
Michigan

In re
Marriage of
Findley v.
Lee323

Female

In re
Marriage of
Nash324

Female

Case

321.
322.
323.
324.
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None of the cases in this set involved a same-sex couple.
757 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
No. FDI-13-780539, 2016 WL 270083, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2016).
No. 62553-5-I, 2009 WL 1514842, *1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 1, 2009).
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